Alphy
A momentum rotation in S&P 500 and Nasdaq-100 stocks with accelerating revenue, plus a gated 3x Nasdaq-100 ETF sleeve, run in a US margin account. Paper trading on the current rules (from 2026-10-31). Backtest, risks and a daily trade log.
1. What it does
- Universe: stocks that are S&P 500 or Nasdaq-100 members on that date. One share class per company.
- Trend filter: the close is above its long-term moving average, and that average is rising.
- Growth filter: year-over-year revenue growth is higher than in the prior quarter.
- Balance-sheet filters: each name is tested for cash and for financial distress against other recent filers, using only filings available at the time.
- Ranking: a medium-term over long-term moving-average ratio, highest first.
- Picks: a small fixed number of names per sleeve. A held name stays while it passes the filters and stays near the top of the ranking. Empty slots go to the highest-ranked names not held.
- Daily check: on every session between rebalances, a held name that no longer passes the filters is sold at the next open. A held name that has fallen in the ranking is sold only when the best name not held is ahead of it by a wide statistical margin. When a sale happens, the sleeve refills and re-weights that day; otherwise it does not trade.
- Admission: on every session, after the rebalance or daily check, a name that has reached the top of the ranking and is larger than every name a sleeve holds can replace that sleeve's weakest held name at the next open, so a new leader can enter without waiting for a held name to drop out.
- Pre-release boost: on every session, when the stock the strategy holds most of (by market value, over all sleeves) is in the run-up to its estimated next earnings release, the stock book is held at a larger size from the next open; it goes back to normal at the open of the estimated release day. Each sleeve keeps its picks and weights and only resizes. The release date is estimated from the company's earnings-release filings (SEC Form 8-K, item 2.02). With no estimate there is no boost.
- Weighting: by company market value raised to a high power, then scaled to a target level of portfolio volatility, with the scale capped. In practice most of each sleeve goes to its largest company (median largest-pick weight 99.9% at the 64 January rebalances, 2011-2026). Market cap (daily, point-in-time, all share classes of the company) is used only for weighting, never for selection.
- Rebalancing: several sleeves of equal size. Each sleeve re-ranks (re-selects its picks) on its own staggered schedule, and re-weights more often: on the re-weight days between two re-ranks it keeps its picks, and its weights, volatility scaling and quality strip are re-applied. The re-weight days are the same for all sleeves. The daily check and admission still run every session. The backtest trades at the next open.
- Leverage: the stock book and the ETF sleeve together stay within a fixed gross limit at a rebalance, more while the pre-release boost is on, where the broker's initial-margin limit scales the extra purchases down. Positions drift between rebalances.
- TQQQ sleeve: a fixed share of equity while a volatility gate is on, resized monthly. The gate turns the sleeve off when QQQ volatility rises past a set level. It turns back on after volatility falls below a lower level, or sooner once volatility has fallen far enough from its peak of the off period (faster re-entry). A faster re-entry is undone if volatility climbs back toward that peak.
- Quality strip: after the sleeves are formed, a hard strip removes names that fail a balance-sheet quality screen. A second, softer screen can cut weight on names that fail it; a name the book already holds is immune to that soft cut. The soft screen combines balance-sheet and accrual quality with a year-over-year fall in gross margin. From 2026-10-31 it no longer includes the inventory-versus-revenue screen (see the changelog).
- Delisting: a held stock whose series ends is cashed at its last close if it was acquired. Any other cause counts as a total loss.
Exact parameter values are not published.
Each trading day
One run before the open:
- About 9:00 AM ET: update the data to the prior close and check it; compute the TQQQ gate, which sleeves rebalance today, the daily check of every held name, the admission check of every sleeve and the pre-release boost (the largest holding and its estimated release date); read the account; build the day's order list before the 9:30 open. The run happens every session, because the daily check can sell on any day. If the data are stale or invalid, the order list is not ready by 9:30, or any check raises an alert, there is no trading that day.
- 9:30 to 10:00 AM ET: buys and sells are worked during the first 30 minutes to beat the opening price, within fixed price and size limits. Sells go first. Anything still open at 10:00 is completed then.
- About 10:30 AM ET: fills are compared with the official open and the trade log is updated.
- Stock sleeves: each sleeve re-ranks on a staggered schedule; all sleeves re-weight together on the days between re-ranks. Every sleeve is also checked on every other session (the daily check above), so eligibility and scores for every held name are computed every day; a check that fires sells at that day's open.
- TQQQ sleeve: while the gate is on, resized to its target share of equity once a month. The gate is checked every session.
- A missed day does not change the rules; the next run works from the account as it stands.
2. Why it works
Momentum and growth. Stocks in strong trends tend to keep going for months. Requiring accelerating revenue drops trends that the business does not back. The cash and distress filters drop fragile balance sheets. Weights by company market value, raised to a high power, put each sleeve almost entirely in its largest leader.
The post-2008 regime. The backtest starts on 2010-02-11, TQQQ's first trading day, and covers only this regime. Rules and policies in effect during it:
- Short-sale circuit breaker (Reg SHO Rule 201, the alternative uptick rule). After a stock falls 10% in a day, short sales must be above the national best bid for the rest of that day and the next. Adopted 2010-02-24; compliance from 2011-02-28. SEC release, compliance date.
- Single-stock pauses after the 2010-05-06 Flash Crash: a 5-minute pause after a 10% move in 5 minutes, approved 2010-06-10. Limit Up-Limit Down bands replaced them from 2013-04-08. SEC 2010, SEC 2012, SEC bulletin.
- Market-wide circuit breakers at 7%, 13% and 20% declines in the S&P 500, approved 2012-05-31 and in effect from 2013-04-08. NYSE, FINRA filing.
- Zero rates and a Fed backstop: the Fed cut the federal funds target range to 0-0.25% on 2008-12-16 and kept it there until 2015-12-16. It cut to 0-0.25% again on 2020-03-15 and kept it there until 2022-03-16. On 2020-03-23 it added open-ended asset purchases and corporate credit facilities. Fed 2008-12-16, Fed 2015-12-16, Fed 2020-03-15, Fed 2020-03-23, Fed 2022-03-16.
A daily-reset 3x ETF loses most in long, choppy declines, where volatility decay compounds. The trading rules above are designed to slow disorderly selling in single stocks and the whole market. The gate takes the sleeve out when QQQ's volatility rises, and the faster re-entry puts it back once volatility has clearly come off its peak instead of waiting for it to fall all the way back.
Limits: these rules do not stop bear markets. In 2022 the Nasdaq-100 fell about 33% and TQQQ about 79%. Regimes can change.
3. Results
Current rules (paper, from 2026-10-31): fixed-January walk-forward 231.31% a year on the research basis (mean over 20 start-day shifts of the schedule 223.89%), CAGR 214.0%, maximum drawdown -59.8% (-57.2% on the headline margin model), on data through 2026-10-28; the median of its rolling four-year CAGRs is 166.2% and a fresh account from 2022 compounds at 338.5% a year. Every rule change, and what it added or cost, is on the Components page. The first row of the table below is the current rules. Research basis, 5 bps per side. The CAGR and MaxDD columns of the first row run through 2026-10-28. Sharpe, the four-year windows, and the buy-and-hold rows are 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02, the window in which holding QQQ gives a Sharpe of 0.90. Strategy rules were selected using these data, so the results carry selection bias. The 151 four-year windows start on the first session of each month from 2010-03 to 2022-09. They overlap. A cell written as median / 10th percentile / worst is that distribution. Calmar is CAGR divided by the depth of the worst drawdown. Sortino uses monthly returns and counts only the down months. Sharpe is daily return above the fed funds rate. Two columns give time underwater in each window: the share of sessions spent below the window's running peak, and the longest single spell below it, in months; both are written as median / worst. The trend line holds QQQ while its close is above its 200-day moving average and holds cash otherwise, at no trading cost, like the buy-and-hold rows. The added rows (the trend line, VGT, Bitcoin, NVIDIA and Broadcom) are computed from public price histories on the same conventions, and they reprint the rows above before they are added. Bitcoin's daily series begins in September 2014, so its figures cover 2014-09 to 2026-10-02 and its windows are the 97 starting from October 2014. NVIDIA and Broadcom are the two best-performing stocks of the window, with total returns of about 598x and 296x.
| CAGR | MaxDD | 4y CAGR median / 10th / worst | 4y MaxDD median / 10th / worst | 4y Calmar median / 10th / worst | 4y Sortino median / 10th / worst | 4y Sharpe median / 10th / worst | Sharpe | 4y underwater, share median / worst | 4y longest underwater spell, months median / worst | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alphy, current rules (2026-10-31; data through 2026-10-28) | 214.0% | -59.8% (2021-01-26 to 2021-03-08) | 167.0% / 110.3% / +86.8% | -44.2% / -59.8% / -59.8% | 4.35 / 2.74 / 1.96 | 5.60 / 4.22 / 3.28 | 1.90 / 1.57 / 1.32 | 1.84 | 82.9% / 87.1% | 5.6 / 9.4 |
| TQQQ, buy and hold | 43.2% | -81.7% (2021-11-19 to 2022-12-28) | 44.7% / 13.7% / +2.0% | -58.2% / -81.7% / -81.7% | 0.81 / 0.17 / 0.03 | 1.81 / 0.81 / 0.55 | 0.96 / 0.50 / 0.36 | 0.87 | 86.7% / 98.1% | 14.1 / 36.3 |
| QQQ, buy and hold | 19.7% | -35.1% (2021-12-27 to 2022-11-03) | 18.1% / 13.4% / +10.2% | -22.8% / -35.1% / -35.1% | 0.88 / 0.41 / 0.30 | 2.27 / 1.11 / 0.82 | 0.99 / 0.54 / 0.40 | 0.90 | 83.5% / 91.5% | 7.8 / 23.5 |
| SPY, buy and hold | 14.5% | -33.7% (2020-02-19 to 2020-03-23) | 13.4% / 10.7% / +6.5% | -19.3% / -33.7% / -33.7% | 0.63 / 0.36 / 0.19 | 1.63 / 1.04 / 0.71 | 0.82 / 0.52 / 0.36 | 0.79 | 83.3% / 88.9% | 8.9 / 23.2 |
| QQQ with a 200-day trend rule | 14.3% | -23.3% (2010-04-23 to 2010-09-07) | 14.1% / 8.7% / +4.8% | -19.0% / -21.9% / -23.3% | 0.79 / 0.40 / 0.24 | 1.78 / 0.92 / 0.63 | 0.91 / 0.56 / 0.34 | 0.83 | 86.6% / 93.2% | 16.5 / 28.5 |
| VGT, buy and hold | 20.8% | -35.1% (2021-12-27 to 2022-10-14) | 18.3% / 14.0% / +10.5% | -27.2% / -35.1% / -35.1% | 0.85 / 0.48 / 0.32 | 2.10 / 1.27 / 0.90 | 0.94 / 0.59 / 0.43 | 0.89 | 84.5% / 91.1% | 7.5 / 22.7 |
| Bitcoin, buy and hold (from Sep 2014) | 54.3% | -83.4% (2017-12-15 to 2018-12-14) | 55.4% / 21.3% / +8.6% | -76.3% / -83.4% / -83.4% | 0.73 / 0.32 / 0.11 | 1.81 / 1.15 / 0.75 | 0.97 / 0.55 / 0.36 | 0.96 | 94.0% / 97.4% | 24.7 / 35.9 |
| NVIDIA, buy and hold | 46.8% | -66.3% (2021-11-29 to 2022-10-14) | 65.9% / 14.1% / -4.8% | -56.0% / -66.3% / -66.3% | 1.10 / 0.31 / -0.09 | 2.48 / 1.05 / 0.03 | 1.23 / 0.53 / 0.03 | 1.04 | 89.0% / 99.6% | 16.4 / 47.3 |
| Broadcom, buy and hold | 40.8% | -48.3% (2020-02-12 to 2020-03-18) | 39.9% / 23.9% / +12.8% | -35.2% / -48.3% / -48.3% | 1.27 / 0.50 / 0.26 | 2.67 / 1.49 / 1.08 | 1.08 / 0.74 / 0.48 | 1.04 | 89.6% / 92.1% | 14.0 / 16.6 |
On the current rules, in all 151 windows the strategy's CAGR and its Calmar are higher than buy-and-hold QQQ and higher than buy-and-hold TQQQ. Buy-and-hold TQQQ beats QQQ on CAGR in 89% of the windows and on Calmar in 21%. The trend rule on QQQ finishes with a lower Sharpe than holding QQQ outright (0.83 against 0.90) and a longer median underwater spell (16.5 months against 7.8), so the one-line overlay does not reproduce the strategy's drawdown control.
Current rules. In-sample backtest, 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-28. The charts and tables in this part come from the same engine run as the headline figures above. Returns include 5 bps per side trading costs, borrowing costs and the margin checks below. Strategy rules and the evaluation period were selected using these data, so results carry selection bias.
Two margin models. Headline: a concentration-stress margin model (maintenance requirements as measured with a broker's own margin calculator, plus a stress requirement on concentrated positions). Second: Robinhood-style standard margin, the research basis every rule change is tested on. Both check maintenance at every close and at the daily lows.
| CAGR | MaxDD | Rolling 4y median | Rolling 4y 10th pct | Worst 4y | Margin breaches | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alphy | 204.8% | -57.2% (2021-01-26 to 2021-03-08) | 167.1% | 110.0% | +86.6% | 27 |
| Same, Robinhood-style margin | 214.0% | -59.8% (2021-01-26 to 2021-03-08) | 167.0% | 110.0% | +86.8% | 0 |
A margin breach is a close or daily low below maintenance; the backtest sells pro rata at the next open to restore maintenance and continues. Rolling windows: 151 four-year windows of the full-run path, one starting on the first session of each month from 2010-03 to 2022-09. They overlap. The mean over the same windows is 215.0% (222.8% Robinhood-style). Starting a fresh account at each window start instead gives a median of 166.2% and a worst window of +86.5% (Robinhood-style margin).
Daily closing values as a multiple of starting capital (start = 1×), headline model, current rules. ETF benchmarks show buy-and-hold total returns.
Drawdown: how far each daily close sits below its previous peak, headline model, current rules.
Calendar-year returns (headline model, current rules):
| 2010 (from 02-11) | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| +81% | +45% | +162% | +253% | +127% | +55% | +67% | +382% | +60% |
| 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 (to 10-28) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| +175% | +1236% | +212% | +165% | +158% | +917% | +276% | +273% |
2022 onward. From 2022-01-03 to 2026-10-28 the full-run path compounds at 316.3% a year (Robinhood-style margin: 342.8%). A fresh account started on 2022-01-03 compounds at 338.5% a year on Robinhood-style margin (311.7% on the headline model); a fresh account starts without the positions and the gains the full run carries into 2022, so the two differ. The rules were chosen on the full history, including these years, so this is not a clean out-of-sample test.
Starting account: the backtest starts from a small notional account. Borrowing spreads step down as the loan grows, so a small account pays the higher spreads for longer. On the current rules, the same rules started from a ten times larger account return 214.4% a year instead of 214.0% on the research basis and 205.2% instead of 204.8% on the headline model, about 0.4 points a year more; the maximum drawdown is unchanged (-59.8% and -57.2%). Every figure on this page uses the small starting account.
Known weaknesses of the daily check (current rules against the same rules without the daily check and the rules that rely on it, Robinhood-style margin). Without it the full run compounds at 123.5% a year instead of 214.0%, but 4 of the 17 calendar years are worse with it: 2010 (+81.6% against +105.8%), 2014 (+126.8% against +130.8%), 2015 (+55.8% against +101.9%) and 2026 to 2026-10-28 (+381.3% against +496.9%). The walk-forward rests on two years: without 2020 the fixed walk-forward falls from 231.3% to 187.6%, and without 2024 to 202.9%. Delaying every trade by one session lowers the CAGR to 187.2%, about 27 points, and the walk-forward to 198.3%: the check has to run every session, on the prior close.
Admission rule: limits. On the current rules it adds 45.3 points a year over the full run (214.0% against 168.7% without it, Robinhood-style margin) and limits the maximum drawdown (-59.8% against -79.7%). It fires rarely: on 21 dates from 2010 to 2024 (81 sleeve admissions; on 19 of the 21 dates all four sleeves at once), and its gain is concentrated: calendar 2020 alone adds 508 points to that year's return, 2018 adds 119, 2023 111 and 2013 71; leaving out any one year still leaves 24.8 to 50.6 points a year (24.8 without 2018). Nearby settings for the admission rank and the market-cap margin were tested before adoption; the adopted rank sits next to a cliff, where a tighter or a looser rank gives back most of the gain, while the market-cap margin is flat. It can buy a late leader: on 2024-12-24 all four sleeves moved into TSLA, which cost 7.5 points of return in the last week of 2024, and calendar 2024 is 94 points lower than without the rule. Its gain over the rules without it has a Sharpe ratio of 0.58 against a luck bar of 0.86 at the 2,579 variants counted now, a deflated Sharpe ratio of 0.11, so it does not pass the deflated test; it rests on the pre-registered test, the walk-forward, the held-out halves and the fresh starts.
Pre-release boost: limits. On the current rules it adds 45.8 points a year over the full run (214.0% against 168.2% without it, Robinhood-style margin). It was on for 54.8% of sessions, over 243 boost windows. Its gain is concentrated: the five largest windows carry 27.6% of it (MU before its 2026-06-24 release, MRNA before 2021-08-04, PLTR before 2025-05-05, NVDA before 2020-05-14, NFLX before 2025-04-17), and calendar 2020 alone adds 509 points to that year's return (2024: 201 points); leaving out any one year still leaves 37.8 to 50.2 points a year. It is a timed increase in leverage, and the margin limit lets only part of it through: on boosted days the stock book is a median 24.8% larger (mean 25.6%). Book size here is the stock positions' value divided by equity at each boosted session's close, compared session by session with the same run without the boost; only one of the 2,301 boosted sessions has a book below half of equity without the boost, and leaving it out changes neither figure. Moving the same boost 20 or 40 sessions before each release gives 178.8% and 176.4% (measured with the boost dates fixed in advance, where the true timing gives 206.8%), so most of the gain comes from the timing (60 sessions before, about one quarter earlier and close to the previous release, gives 193.7%). It raises concentration: the largest single position reaches 2.68x equity (MU, 2026-03-30) against 1.87x without it. Under the stress margin model it adds forced sales (368 against 30 in the full run; 193.6% against 164.9% a year). It depends on a daily feed of earnings-release filings: if the feed is missing or stale, the day's signal is not traded. The release dates are checked against a second source, the SEC's own filing record, for all 62 companies that were the strategy's largest stock holding on any session of the full run, from 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16 (where the copy of the SEC record used ends): of 3,685 release dates, 3,684 match an SEC filing within one day (3,629 on the same day), the SEC record has no release the dates miss, and one date (MU, 2017-09-26) has no SEC release filing within three days. The way the next release date is estimated matters little: the two other estimates tested give 214.0% and 210.5%; the second has one margin breach under Robinhood-style margin in the full run and at least one in 47 of the 151 fresh four-year starts (none with the estimate used).
Sensitivity tests. Current rules, each change applied separately, research basis (Robinhood-style margin), full run 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-28. Base: CAGR 214.0%, maximum drawdown -59.8%. An excluded stock is removed from the universe for the whole run.
| Test | CAGR | MaxDD |
|---|---|---|
| Trading costs of 10 bps per side | 209.4% | -59.8% |
| Trading costs of 25 bps per side | 195.8% | -60.0% |
| NVDA excluded | 175.4% | -59.8% |
| MU excluded | 198.7% | -82.9% |
| PLTR excluded | 186.3% | -59.8% |
| Five largest contributors excluded (NVDA, PLTR, MU, TSLA, MRNA) | 94.3% | -82.9% |
| Stress margin model with forced sales (368 forced sales in the full run) | 193.6% | -55.2% |
How it was tested
- Period: 2010-02-11 (TQQQ's first trading day) to 2026-10-28 only, so every result comes from the rate and market-structure regime described above.
- Universe: survivorship-bias-free, point-in-time S&P 500 and Nasdaq-100 membership, including later-delisted names. Prices are adjusted for splits and dividends.
- Filings: quarterly figures as originally reported, used only after the filing was public.
- Delistings: four held names were delisted, all acquisitions, cashed at their last close. Any other kind of delisting counts as a total loss.
- Costs and margin: 5 bps per side, margin interest, and maintenance checked at every close and at the daily lows under two broker margin models. Current rules: no breach in the full run and none in any of the 151 fresh four-year starts under Robinhood-style margin; 27 breaches in the full run under the headline model. The same rules without the pre-release boost have 5 breaches under the headline model and without the admission rule 31; without the daily check they have one breach under Robinhood-style margin in the full run and at least one in 47 of the 151 fresh four-year starts.
- Train, then check: the rules were chosen on the full history, so 2022 onward is not a clean test. On 2010-2021 the current rules compound at 172.8% a year, and a fresh account from 2022-01-03 at 338.5%. The same rules without the daily check give 91.8% and 221.8%, without the admission rule 129.4% and 291.7%, and without the pre-release boost 140.4% and 247.3%.
- Fresh starts: 151 four-year windows, each a new account, starting every month from 2010-03 to 2022-09. Current rules (Robinhood-style margin): median 166.2% a year, 10th percentile 109.7%, worst +86.5%. Without the pre-release boost: median 141.6%, 10th percentile 93.0%, worst +74.1%; without the admission rule 127.8%, 75.3% and +47.6%; without the daily check 103.2%, 43.9% and +7.2%. The current rules beat the rules without the daily check in 145 of the 151 starts.
- Walk-forward: re-choosing the rules each January from 2014 to 2025, using only returns from 2010-02-11 to that January, among the current rules and the same rules without the pre-release boost, without the admission rule and without the daily check, picks the current rules every year: 231.3% a year, the same as the current rules held fixed. Held fixed, the rules without the pre-release boost give 182.1%, without the admission rule 174.5% and without the daily check 112.7%; the current rules beat the rules without the daily check in 10 of the 12 years. These are the parts the rules were built from, so this is a check of the parts, not of every alternative tried. The rank buffer, the stock volatility target, the weighting power and the faster TQQQ re-entry were chosen on the full history.
- TQQQ gate: in four-year folds with a fresh account in each (current rules, Robinhood-style margin, data from 2010-02-11 only), the gated sleeve compounded at 131.7% a year in 2011-2014, 106.9% in 2015-2018, 337.3% in 2019-2022 and 396.3% in 2023 to 2026-10-28, against 124.1%, 110.3%, 319.6% and 382.2% with no sleeve and 131.7%, 103.3%, 329.9% and 399.2% with the sleeve always on. In 2015-2018 the sleeve cost return: 3.4 points with the gate and 7.0 always on. In each fold the stock book is the same and only the sleeve changes. Chosen on returns from 2010-02-11 to each fold's start, the gate was picked in 2 of the 4 folds and the always-on sleeve in the other 2; dropping the sleeve was never picked. Choosing this way gives 216.5% a year over the four folds, against 217.9% for the gate held fixed and 211.1% for no sleeve. No fold has a margin breach.
- Held-out halves: the current rules beat the same rules without the daily check in 10 of 10 splits of the years into two halves, with and without a 63-session gap between the halves (smallest gain 17.8 points). The pre-release boost and the admission rule each pass the same test (below).
- Pre-release boost: pre-registered before any run, with its pass conditions, nearby settings, placebo timings and a sign check fixed in advance. On the current rules the walk-forward is 231.3% with it against 182.1% without it; across 20 starts of the stock schedule (0 to 19 sessions after 2010-02-11) it adds +45.2 to +50.6 points (mean +48.0), positive in all 20. It beats the rules without it in all 151 fresh four-year starts (median gain 29.7 points, smallest 12.3), and in 10 of 10 held-out halves, with and without a 63-session gap between the halves (smallest gain 18.2 and 16.4 points). On 2010-2021 it gives 172.8% against 140.4%, and on a fresh account from 2022-01-03 338.5% against 247.3%. Nearby settings: a smaller boost gives a walk-forward of 223.4% and a larger one 232.5%; shorter windows give 221.0% and 229.0%, a longer one 237.0%; cutting instead of boosting over the same windows gives 183.1%, about the same as no boost. Its gain over the rules without it has a Sharpe ratio of 1.75 against a luck bar of 0.86 at the 2,579 variants counted now, a deflated Sharpe ratio above 0.99, so it passes the deflated test.
- Admission rule: pre-registered before any run, with its nearby settings fixed in advance. On the current rules the walk-forward is 231.3% with it against 174.5% without it; across 20 starts of the stock schedule (0 to 19 sessions after 2010-02-11) it adds +50.2 to +64.2 points (mean +56.9), positive in all 20. It beats the rules without it in 141 of the 151 fresh four-year starts (median gain 54.5 points, worst -5.2), and in 10 of 10 held-out halves, with and without a 63-session gap between the halves (smallest gain 7.6 points both ways). On 2010-2021 it gives 172.8% against 129.4%, and on a fresh account from 2022-01-03 338.5% against 291.7%. Nearby settings: a tighter rank limit gives a walk-forward of 177.2% and looser ones 199.5% and 167.2%; a smaller or larger market-cap margin gives 231.3% and 231.9%.
- Nearby settings: on the current rules (214.0% a year, walk-forward 231.3%), one step down and one step up for each of the replacement margin, the TQQQ gate threshold, the stock volatility target and the weighting power gives 209.1% to 215.4% (walk-forward 225.0% to 233.3%). The rank buffer is the least smooth: both of its nearby values give less, 204.6% and 201.9% (walk-forward 220.4% and 213.8%). With no replacement margin at all (any held name that has fallen in the ranking rotates out) the CAGR is 179.0%. Shifting every stock sleeve's schedule by 1 to 4 sessions gives 203.5% to 210.4% (walk-forward 216.5% to 225.9%). None of these has a breach under Robinhood-style margin, and the maximum drawdown stays between -59.8% and -60.5%.
- Faster re-entry: it fired in four of the gate's off periods (2011, 2020, 2022, 2025; 34 trading days in all), each time ending in the normal re-entry. Its gain rests on those four episodes and is small: on the current rules, nearby levels give 213.6% and 213.2% a year against 214.0%, and no faster re-entry gives 212.5% (walk-forward 230.2% against 231.3%), with the early re-rank when the gate turns back on kept.
- Multiple testing: 2,579 variants have been tested in the research rounds. Each part of the current rules was measured against the same rules without it, over the full run on Robinhood-style margin, with a bootstrap 90% interval for the gain (resampling blocks of about 20 sessions). Without the daily check, and the rules that rely on it (admission, the separate re-rank schedule and an early re-rank after a market rebound or when the TQQQ gate turns back on), the CAGR is 123.5% instead of 214.0%; the gain's 90% interval is +42.9 to +145.2 points. Without the admission rule: 168.7%, interval +13.3 to +83.5 points. Without the pre-release boost: 168.2%, interval +25.4 to +75.6 points. Deflated for the 2,579 variants, the daily check's Sharpe ratio test gives 0.25 and the admission rule's 0.11, so neither passes the deflated test; they rest on the walk-forward, the held-out halves and the nearby settings. The pre-release boost's gives above 0.99 and passes.
- Luck benchmark: with 2,579 variants tested, the best improvement over the rules it replaces that luck alone would be expected to produce has a Sharpe ratio of about 0.86 (1.63 using the spread of every stored variant), and this bar rises with every variant added. On the current rules, the daily check's improvement over the same rules without it has a Sharpe ratio of 0.70 and the admission rule's 0.58, both below the bar; the pre-release boost's is 1.75, above both bars. For whole strategies (return above cash) the luck bar is 0.43 to 0.86; Alphy's Sharpe ratio is 1.84 on the current rules, and holding QQQ gives 0.90 and SPY 0.79 over the same years (TQQQ buy and hold is 0.87).
- Concentration: without its five largest contributors (NVDA, PLTR, MU, TSLA, MRNA) the CAGR is 94.3% and the maximum drawdown -82.9% (current rules, research basis). The same five names supply 53% of the stock book's positive contribution (each day's weight times the next day's return, summed by name).
What was tried and decided against
Every candidate this program has decided against is listed here in full.
Candidates decided against in this research program. Each delta is in percentage points (pp) against the base named in its row, on the window named in its row. Deltas in different rows were measured against different bases and do not rank against each other.
Outcomes: a candidate can pass the bar and still not be adopted, be rejected on its measurements, or be stopped by a diagnostic before a backtest could bind.
Bases
Each delta was measured against the base named in its row:
- Oct 11 rules: the live rules from 2026-10-11 to 2026-10-13.
- Oct 13 starting rules: the rules adopted on 2026-10-13, before event rotation (replaced the same day).
- event-rotation finalist: the Oct 13 starting rules plus daily event rotation, before the admission rule (a research base on 2026-10-13).
- Oct 13 rules: event rotation plus the leader-emergence admission, live 2026-10-13 to 2026-10-14.
- Oct 14 rules: the Oct 13 rules plus the pre-release boost on the top name, from 2026-10-14; the variant with the smaller leveraged-ETF sleeve in the pre-release window followed the same day.
- Oct 15 rules: the Oct 14 rules after the 2026-10-15 changes (volatility target, release-session hold, release estimate without the fallback rule), live 2026-10-15 to 2026-10-16.
- Oct 16 rules: the Oct 15 rules after the 2026-10-16 changes (post-release cut added, carry cap removed), live 2026-10-16 to 2026-10-22.
- Oct 14-22 rules: the rules in use from 2026-10-14 to 2026-10-22 (the Oct 14, Oct 15 and Oct 16 rules above); rows that name only this range were measured on one of them.
- Oct 22 rules: the Oct 16 rules plus the dip rule on the top name with a smaller leveraged-ETF sleeve, live 2026-10-22 to 2026-10-28 (replaced by the quality strip on 2026-10-28).
- early-October combined base: a combined variant that served briefly as the research base in October 2026, before 2026-10-13.
- retired base: an earlier research base, retired before the October 2026 bases; those rows ran on a window ending 2026-09-18.
- published-factor test base: a one-off variant of the rules (a regime-gated, capped weighting) used as the base for the published-factor batch.
- matched 5-sleeve all-momentum control: a five-sleeve all-momentum portfolio built as the control for the event-sleeve study.
Passed the bar, not adopted (5)
| Candidate | Headline delta | Reason | Deciding facts |
|---|---|---|---|
| Speed blend (a half-and-half blend of the Oct 13 starting rules and the event-rotation finalist) | -8.10pp CAGR vs event-rotation finalist; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Concentration (a few names or years carry the result) | Half starting rules / half event-rotation finalist stock book returned 114.72% CAGR (+7.50pp vs the Oct 13 starting rules, -8.10pp vs the finalist) with fixed-January walk-forward 103.6%, and its leave-one-year-out fixed-January walk-forward fell below 100% without 2017 (95.7%), 2020 (82.3%) or 2024 (84.2%), so it passed the bar against the Oct 13 starting rules but was not adopted over the finalist. |
| Event-rotation near-finalists (50-day average confirmation; split buffer; release-day window of 5) | +0.50pp CAGR vs event-rotation finalist; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Mechanism overlap | Three sibling versions beat or matched the finalist on single headline figures (the 50-day average confirmation 124.6% CAGR and 116.1% fixed-January walk-forward; the split buffer 117.3% fixed-January walk-forward at 120.7% CAGR; the 5-day window maximum drawdown -53.5% at 117.0% CAGR) but none was adopted, because the finalist won the family walk-forward (114.9%, picked in all 12 years, vs 102.4% for the 50-day-average family) and the rolling four-year median. |
| Consensus-miss exclusion, any coverage (20 sessions) | +4.40pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Mechanism overlap | The post-hoc any-coverage form of the high-coverage consensus-miss exclusion passed its pre-registered retest marginally (+4.4pp CAGR, January walk-forward 84.5% vs 80.2%, DSR 0.00, 91.6% coverage of reports) and sits not adopted. On the Oct 14-22 rules it was skipped, because no point-in-time consensus source is usable live, so it is not an open live option. |
| Event-driven rebalancing (daily rotation out of the buffer) | +6.40pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Superseded by an adopted variant | Rotating a held name out at the next open as soon as it became ineligible or fell outside a rank buffer of 12 (fixed schedule kept) added +6.4pp CAGR vs the Oct 11 rules (101.2%), with a January walk-forward of 88.0% vs 80.2%, a four-year win rate of 74% and +18.7pp from 2022 onward, but it sat below the 10pp adoption bar, with maximum drawdown -62.1% vs -57.3%, a deflated Sharpe ratio of 0.00 and stress forced liquidations of 193 vs 120; the pre-registered confirmation then failed: the result spikes at one buffer size (buffers 10 to 14 read +2.6 / +3.6 / +6.4 / +11.9 / +6.8pp, a 5.5pp step from 12 to 13 against a 4pp limit, and buffer 9 read -0.4pp in the original grid), and the four-year-fold walk-forward read 100.0% vs the control's 100.4%. Its stronger descendant, with a statistical margin on the replacement test, is the adopted daily check; this standalone form was not adopted. |
| Cost-aware vol target under Robinhood-style margin (train-best 0-breach vt 0.75) | +1.60pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Not chosen | Choosing the train-best vol target with zero breaches under Robinhood-style margin (vt 0.75) met the mechanical bar marginally at +1.6pp CAGR vs live Oct 11 rules (train +1.4, fresh 2022+ +2.1, 4y win 89%, family January walk-forward 81.6% vs 80.2%, 0 breaches under Robinhood-style margin) but was not adopted: it is a leverage dial (MaxDD -58.6% vs -57.3%), DSR 0.00, and the family walk-forward picked the grid edges (vt 0.50 / 0.80) in all 12 years, never vt 0.75; the same family at vt above 0.70 had already been rejected. |
Rejected (195)
| Candidate | Headline delta | Reason | Deciding facts |
|---|---|---|---|
| Effective-date index reconstitution lead-capture sleeve on the Oct 22 rules | -58.20pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Catching names in the stock book for five sessions around index effective-date reconstitutions cut fixed-January walk-forward by 58.20pp vs Oct 22 rules (exposure-matched gap +55pp): the forced-flow timing is not free altitude on this concentrated book. |
| Short-squeeze leverage boost (short-interest data), on the Oct 22 rules | -12.04pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Adding leverage when short-interest data signalled a likely short squeeze cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 12.04pp vs the Oct 22 rules, even though it beat the exposure-matched test: short-squeeze timing does not add return on these rules. |
| Adverse 8-K cluster admission veto on the Oct 22 rules | -11.49pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Vetoing admissions after an adverse 8-K cluster (W=5, H=21) cut fixed-January walk-forward by 11.49pp vs Oct 22 rules: cluster timing does not lift the book. |
| Leverage boost after a new buyback authorization (8-K filings), on the Oct 22 rules | -10.25pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | A short leverage boost after a company filed a new share-buyback authorization (from 8-K filings, not the corporate-actions feed) cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 10.25pp vs the Oct 22 rules: buyback-announcement timing hurts on these rules. |
| Lead selling-climax volume brake on the Oct 22 rules | -12.90pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Cutting the lead after a selling-climax volume print cut fixed-January walk-forward by 12.90pp vs Oct 22 rules: microstructure climax brakes lose on this concentrated book. |
| 8-K Item 2.01 acquisition rank-exit stickiness on the Oct 22 rules | -11.55pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Holding rank-exits after 8-K 2.01 acquisition completions cut fixed-January walk-forward by 11.55pp vs Oct 22 rules. |
| Leverage boost on heavy buyback execution (10-Q filings), on the Oct 22 rules | -9.56pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Boosting leverage when quarterly 10-Q filings showed heavy share repurchases cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 9.56pp vs the Oct 22 rules (a separate test from the buyback-authorization boost). |
| Deferred-revenue and operating-cash dial on the pre-release boost on the Oct 22 rules | -15.53pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Dialing the pre-release boost from deferredrev∧ncfo YoY cut fixed-January walk-forward by 15.53pp vs Oct 22 rules: release-window dose is not free headroom. |
| NFCI continuous stock-sleeve scaler on the Oct 22 rules | -13.44pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Scaling the stock sleeve continuously with Chicago Fed NFCI cut fixed-January walk-forward by 13.44pp vs Oct 22 rules: financial-conditions compression of the stock book is hostile here. |
| Dual-list calendar stock leverage pulse on the Oct 22 rules | -10.18pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Raising stock leverage on dual-list calendar days cut fixed-January walk-forward by 10.18pp vs Oct 22 rules despite clearing kinship kills vs the post-release cut. |
| Stock-book cut on a weekly jump in the St. Louis Fed financial stress index, on the Oct 22 rules | -13.10pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Cutting the stock book when the St. Louis Fed's weekly financial stress index jumped from the week before cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 13.10pp vs the Oct 22 rules, the same direction as the rejected Chicago Fed financial-conditions scaler. |
| Index-addition sleeve between announcement and effective date (re-run with announcement dates), on the Oct 22 rules | -9.61pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Once index-change announcement dates were added to the data, a sleeve holding newly announced index additions until they took effect passed the pre-run mechanics check but still cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 9.61pp vs the Oct 22 rules (the candidate's walk-forward was 162.00%). |
| Lead-weight cap when days-to-cover is high (short-interest data), on the Oct 22 rules | -11.07pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Capping the top name at 0.75 of its weight when its days-to-cover (short interest divided by daily volume) was in the top fifth cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 11.07pp vs the Oct 22 rules (the candidate's walk-forward was 160.54%). |
| Shift into other assets on the S&P 500 futures basis, on the Oct 22 rules | -20.24pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Moving money into other assets based on the S&P 500 futures basis (from a free data source) cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 20.24pp vs the Oct 22 rules (the candidate's walk-forward was 151.36%): the futures basis adds nothing on these rules. |
| FINRA short-volume breadth whole-book/TQQQ risk resize on the Oct 22 rules | -12.57pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Resizing risk from FINRA short-volume breadth cut fixed-January walk-forward by 12.57pp vs Oct 22 rules. |
| Admission freeze while several holdings report earnings (earnings-calendar data), on the Oct 22 rules | -24.64pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Freezing new admissions when two or more held names had reported earnings in the last five sessions cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 24.64pp vs the Oct 22 rules. |
| ZN/NQ futures-state TQQQ-only sizing on the Oct 22 rules | -12.40pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Sizing only the TQQQ sleeve from ZN/NQ futures state cut fixed-January walk-forward by 12.40pp vs Oct 22 rules. |
| Small sleeve of newly spun-off companies (corporate-actions feed), on the Oct 22 rules | -11.93pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | An 8% sleeve holding newly spun-off companies for 10 sessions cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 11.93pp vs the Oct 22 rules. |
| Leverage boost when a passive holder first crosses 5% (13G filings), on the Oct 22 rules | -11.00pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | A short leverage boost when a passive investor first filed a 13G stake in the top name cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 11.00pp vs the Oct 22 rules (the activist 13D version was dropped at the pre-run mechanics check). |
| Small sleeve of companies that just spun off a unit (corporate-actions feed), on the Oct 22 rules | -16.55pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | An 8% sleeve holding the parent companies of fresh spin-offs for 10 sessions cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 16.55pp vs the Oct 22 rules. |
| Small sleeve of new listings (corporate-actions feed), on the Oct 22 rules | -11.53pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | An added 8% sleeve holding newly listed companies for 10 sessions, with no overlap with the rules' own holdings during the hold, still cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 11.53pp vs the Oct 22 rules. |
| Continuous regime-model exposure scale (published paper, arXiv 2402.05272), on the Oct 22 rules | -21.69pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Scaling exposure continuously by a statistical jump-model regime estimate cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 21.69pp vs the Oct 22 rules (the candidate's walk-forward was 149.91%, and it was 0.24pp behind the exposure-matched test). |
| Volume-price divergence admission (published paper, arXiv 2508.14656), on the Oct 22 rules | -79.83pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Admitting names on a divergence between trading volume and price cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 79.83pp vs the Oct 22 rules (the candidate's walk-forward was 91.77%). |
| Regime-ranking overlay, first form (from a published-paper review), on the Oct 22 rules | -13.92pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | A regime-ranking overlay, charged for its trading, cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 13.92pp vs the Oct 22 rules (the candidate's walk-forward was 157.68%): a second sleeve or overlay dilutes these rules. |
| Regime-ranking overlay, second form (from a published-paper review), on the Oct 22 rules | -12.79pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | A second regime-ranking overlay, charged for its trading, cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 12.79pp vs the Oct 22 rules (the candidate's walk-forward was 158.82%). |
| Structural idea from a published-paper review: form 1, on the Oct 22 rules | -46.19pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | The first structural change drawn from a review of published papers cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 46.19pp vs the Oct 22 rules (the candidate's walk-forward was 125.42%). |
| Structural idea from a published-paper review: form 2, on the Oct 22 rules | -17.45pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | The second structural change from the same review cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 17.45pp vs the Oct 22 rules (the candidate's walk-forward was 154.15%). |
| Structural idea from a published-paper review: form 3, on the Oct 22 rules | -55.87pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | The third structural change from the same review cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 55.87pp vs the Oct 22 rules (the candidate's walk-forward was 115.73%). |
| Structural idea from a published-paper review: form 4, on the Oct 22 rules | -16.90pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | The fourth structural change from the same review cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 16.90pp vs the Oct 22 rules (the candidate's walk-forward was 154.70%). |
| Structural idea from a published-paper review: form 5, on the Oct 22 rules | -13.47pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | The fifth structural change from the same review cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 13.47pp vs the Oct 22 rules (the candidate's walk-forward was 158.13%). |
| Stock-book scale from the SPY-QQQ lead-lag (published paper, arXiv 2201.08283), on the Oct 22 rules | -12.82pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Scaling the stock book by whether SPY or QQQ was leading cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 12.82pp vs the Oct 22 rules; it beat the exposure-matched test by +2.64pp but still lost to the rules. |
| Admission damper on heavy short-sale volume (FINRA short-volume data), on the Oct 22 rules | -36.46pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Damping admissions of names with heavy daily short-sale volume cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 36.46pp vs the Oct 22 rules. |
| Two-rate regime scale from the Fed funds and 3-month T-bill rates (published paper, arXiv 2503.11499), on the Oct 22 rules | -43.14pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Scaling exposure by a regime read from the Fed funds rate and the 3-month Treasury bill rate cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 43.14pp vs the Oct 22 rules. |
| Demoting names whose gains come overnight (published paper, arXiv 1410.5513), on the Oct 22 rules | -80.63pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Demoting names whose returns came mostly overnight cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 80.63pp vs the Oct 22 rules. |
| Demoting names slow to recover from drawdowns (published paper, arXiv 1403.8125), on the Oct 22 rules | +4.72pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Demoting names slow to recover from their largest drawdown added +4.72pp to the fixed-January walk-forward (and beat the exposure-matched test by +33.07pp) but missed the +5pp bar in force then, so it was rejected. |
| Admission screen: high three-month realized volatility, on the Oct 22 rules | -68.82pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Screening out names by high three-month realized volatility cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 68.82pp vs the Oct 22 rules. |
| Demoting names with deep drawdowns (published paper, arXiv 1403.8125), on the Oct 22 rules | -113.34pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Demoting names by the depth of their largest drawdown cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 113.34pp vs the Oct 22 rules. |
| Admission screen: left-tail sensitivity to market falls (beyond their normal market sensitivity), on the Oct 22 rules | -65.80pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Screening out names by left-tail sensitivity to market falls (beyond their normal market sensitivity) cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 65.80pp vs the Oct 22 rules. |
| Admission screen: crash risk (negative skew of their returns), on the Oct 22 rules | -56.70pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Screening out names by crash risk (negative skew of their returns) cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 56.70pp vs the Oct 22 rules. |
| Admission screen: year-over-year net income, bottom 5%, on the Oct 22 rules | +11.40pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Screening out names by year-over-year net income, bottom 5% added +11.40pp to the fixed-January walk-forward vs the Oct 22 rules but failed the second-stage checks (it failed one of them), so it was rejected. |
| Admission screen: year-over-year net income, bottom 10%, on the Oct 22 rules | +15.20pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Screening out names by year-over-year net income, bottom 10% added +15.20pp to the fixed-January walk-forward vs the Oct 22 rules but failed the second-stage checks (the walk-forward and 2022-onward checks), so it was rejected. |
| Admission screen: slowing year-over-year net income growth, bottom 5%, on the Oct 22 rules | -18.10pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Screening out names by slowing year-over-year net income growth, bottom 5% cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 18.10pp vs the Oct 22 rules. |
| Admission screen: year-over-year change in cash to assets, bottom 4%, on the Oct 22 rules | -10.08pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Screening out names by year-over-year change in cash to assets, bottom 4% cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 10.08pp vs the Oct 22 rules. |
| Admission screen: year-over-year rise in debt to assets, top 4%, on the Oct 22 rules | -8.20pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Screening out names by year-over-year rise in debt to assets, top 4% cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 8.20pp vs the Oct 22 rules. |
| Admission screen: year-over-year change in current ratio, bottom 4%, on the Oct 22 rules | -41.02pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Screening out names by year-over-year change in current ratio, bottom 4% cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 41.02pp vs the Oct 22 rules. |
| Admission screen: year-over-year earnings per share, bottom 4%, on the Oct 22 rules | +11.20pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Screening out names by year-over-year earnings per share, bottom 4% added +11.20pp to the fixed-January walk-forward vs the Oct 22 rules but failed the second-stage checks (the risk checks), so it was rejected. |
| Admission screen: year-over-year return on assets, bottom 4%, on the Oct 22 rules | +10.27pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Screening out names by year-over-year return on assets, bottom 4% added +10.27pp to the fixed-January walk-forward vs the Oct 22 rules but failed the second-stage checks (the risk checks), so it was rejected. |
| Admission screen: year-over-year asset growth, top 4%, on the Oct 22 rules | -105.69pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Screening out names by year-over-year asset growth, top 4% cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 105.69pp vs the Oct 22 rules. |
| Admission screen: revenue at or above the median with net income in the bottom quarter, on the Oct 22 rules | -1.49pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Screening out names by revenue at or above the median with net income in the bottom quarter cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 1.49pp vs the Oct 22 rules. |
| Admission screen: year-over-year net margin, bottom 4%, on the Oct 22 rules | +9.64pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Screening out names by year-over-year net margin, bottom 4% added +9.64pp to the fixed-January walk-forward vs the Oct 22 rules but failed the second-stage checks (maximum drawdown and the 2022-onward era), so it was rejected. |
| Admission screen: year-over-year revenue growth, top 4%, on the Oct 22 rules | -96.57pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Screening out names by year-over-year revenue growth, top 4% cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 96.57pp vs the Oct 22 rules. |
| Admission screen: two quarters in a row of falling year-over-year net income, on the Oct 22 rules | +15.33pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Screening out names by two quarters in a row of falling year-over-year net income added +15.33pp to the fixed-January walk-forward vs the Oct 22 rules but failed the second-stage checks (maximum drawdown and the 2022-onward era), so it was rejected. |
| Admission screen: asset growth in the top quarter with revenue at or below the median, on the Oct 22 rules | -7.15pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Screening out names by asset growth in the top quarter with revenue at or below the median cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 7.15pp vs the Oct 22 rules. |
| Admission screen: unusually high trading volume, top 4%, on the Oct 22 rules | -9.60pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Screening out names by unusually high trading volume, top 4% cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 9.60pp vs the Oct 22 rules. |
| Admission screen: unusually low trading volume, bottom 4%, on the Oct 22 rules | -20.77pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Screening out names by unusually low trading volume, bottom 4% cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 20.77pp vs the Oct 22 rules. |
| Admission screen: slowing momentum, bottom 4%, on the Oct 22 rules | -52.85pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Screening out names by slowing momentum, bottom 4% cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 52.85pp vs the Oct 22 rules. |
| Admission screen: one-month return, top 4% (exhaustion), on the Oct 22 rules | -66.12pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Screening out names by one-month return, top 4% (exhaustion) cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 66.12pp vs the Oct 22 rules. |
| Admission screen: daily high-low range relative to price, top 4%, on the Oct 22 rules | -73.58pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Screening out names by daily high-low range relative to price, top 4% cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 73.58pp vs the Oct 22 rules. |
| Admission screen: a rising one-month price on falling volume, on the Oct 22 rules | -81.53pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Screening out names by a rising one-month price on falling volume cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 81.53pp vs the Oct 22 rules. |
| Admission screen: thin dollar volume among strong-momentum names, bottom quarter, on the Oct 22 rules | +0.31pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Screening out names by thin dollar volume among strong-momentum names, bottom quarter added +0.31pp to the fixed-January walk-forward vs the Oct 22 rules but failed the second-stage checks (the rolling four-year median and the year-by-year walk-forward), so it was rejected. |
| Admission screen: down-day versus up-day volatility, top 4%, on the Oct 22 rules | +1.16pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Screening out names by down-day versus up-day volatility, top 4% added +1.16pp to the fixed-January walk-forward vs the Oct 22 rules but failed the second-stage checks (the rolling four-year median and the year-by-year walk-forward), so it was rejected. |
| Admission screen: net signed volume, bottom 4%, on the Oct 22 rules | +1.16pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Screening out names by net signed volume, bottom 4% added +1.16pp to the fixed-January walk-forward vs the Oct 22 rules but failed the second-stage checks (the rolling four-year median and the year-by-year walk-forward), so it was rejected. |
| Admission screen: price far below the 63-day high (broken momentum), bottom 4%, on the Oct 22 rules | +3.55pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Screening out names by price far below the 63-day high (broken momentum), bottom 4% added +3.55pp to the fixed-January walk-forward vs the Oct 22 rules but failed the second-stage checks (the rolling four-year median and the year-by-year walk-forward), so it was rejected. |
| Admission screen: accelerating momentum, top 4%, on the Oct 22 rules | -29.69pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Screening out names by accelerating momentum, top 4% cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 29.69pp vs the Oct 22 rules. |
| Admission screen: turnover (dollar volume relative to market value), top 4%, on the Oct 22 rules | -101.60pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Screening out names by turnover (dollar volume relative to market value), top 4% cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 101.60pp vs the Oct 22 rules. |
| Admission screen: weak one-week return among strong-momentum names, bottom quarter, on the Oct 22 rules | -69.36pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Screening out names by weak one-week return among strong-momentum names, bottom quarter cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 69.36pp vs the Oct 22 rules. |
| Admission screen: weak open-to-close moves, bottom 4%, on the Oct 22 rules | -20.08pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Screening out names by weak open-to-close moves, bottom 4% cut the fixed-January walk-forward by 20.08pp vs the Oct 22 rules. |
| Combined screen: the leading quality screen plus an inventory-coverage screen, on the Oct 22 rules | +14.43pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Combining the leading quality screen of that week with an inventory-coverage screen measured +14.43pp on the fixed-January walk-forward vs the Oct 22 rules but failed the second-stage checks, so it was rejected. |
| Combined screen: the leading quality screen plus a debt screen (bottom 10%), on the Oct 22 rules | +23.92pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Combining the leading quality screen with a debt screen measured +23.92pp on the fixed-January walk-forward vs the Oct 22 rules but failed the rolling four-year median and year-by-year walk-forward checks. |
| Combined screen: the leading quality screen plus inventory-coverage and debt screens, on the Oct 22 rules | +20.41pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Combining all three screens measured +20.41pp on the fixed-January walk-forward vs the Oct 22 rules but failed the rolling four-year median, year-by-year walk-forward and headline-model breach checks. |
| Combined screen: debt to assets relative to industry peers, top 10%, on the Oct 22 rules | +7.66pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Adding a peer-relative debt-to-assets screen measured +7.66pp on the fixed-January walk-forward vs the Oct 22 rules but was rejected. |
| Combined screen: net income relative to debt, bottom 10%, on the Oct 22 rules | +11.53pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Adding a net-income-to-debt screen measured +11.53pp on the fixed-January walk-forward vs the Oct 22 rules but was rejected. |
| Combined screen: cash relative to debt, bottom 10%, on the Oct 22 rules | +0.00pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Adding a cash-to-debt screen changed nothing (+0.00pp on the fixed-January walk-forward vs the Oct 22 rules), so it was rejected as inert. |
| Combined screen: interest coverage relative to industry peers, bottom 10%, on the Oct 22 rules | +21.38pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Adding a peer-relative interest-coverage screen (operating profit over interest expense) measured +21.38pp on the fixed-January walk-forward vs the Oct 22 rules but was rejected. |
| Combined screen: the leading quality screen plus a peer-relative inventory-coverage screen, on the Oct 22 rules | +25.47pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | This combination measured +25.47pp on the fixed-January walk-forward vs the Oct 22 rules (the candidate's walk-forward was 197.07%, just short of 200%) but failed the rolling four-year median, year-by-year walk-forward and headline-model breach checks. |
| Denser strict combinations of the quality and peer-relative inventory screens, on the Oct 22 rules | +23.15pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Stricter, denser combinations of these screens lifted the candidate's walk-forward to about 194-197% (the best +23.15pp vs the Oct 22 rules) but failed the rolling four-year median and headline-model breach checks; the best candidate that passed in this round was a strict balance-sheet screen at 195.93%, still short of 200%. |
| Strict high-quality combinations that reached about 204% but failed the risk checks, on the Oct 22 rules | +32.80pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Strict combinations of the quality, inventory-coverage and large-company screens reached a walk-forward of 203.1-204.4% (the best +32.80pp vs the Oct 22 rules) but failed the rolling four-year median and headline-model breach checks; the version that passed every check was softer, at 200.88%. |
| Earnings-floor and cash-flow screens added to the leading candidate, on the Oct 22 rules | -8.00pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Added to the leading candidate of the time (the balance-sheet and accrual screen, 212.40%), an earnings-floor screen still passed at 204.92% but gave up about 8pp, and strict free-cash-flow and cash-conversion screens failed the headline-model breach check: these families do not add return. |
| Market-wide 200-day trend gate: the whole strategy (stocks and the leveraged Nasdaq sleeve) moved to cash whenever the S&P 500 ETF closed below its 200-day moving average, on the Oct 14-22 rules | -47.46pp CAGR vs the Oct 14-22 rules (Oct 14 rules); window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward (also: Negative in the fresh era (2022 onward)) | Going fully to cash whenever SPY closed below its 200-day moving average (the classic Faber / Paul Tudor Jones rule) cut CAGR from 162.0% to 114.5% and the fixed-January walk-forward from 160.4% to 105.2%, and did not reduce the worst drawdown at all (-52.0%, a 2021 leader drawdown while SPY was in an uptrend): the gate was off 16% of the time and sat out the sharp rebounds the book earns most in (2020, 2022-23, 2025); the same rule on QQQ was worse on drawdown (-65.5%). On SPY alone the rule kept its textbook trade, 9.9% a year at -20.9% worst drawdown against buy-and-hold's 14.4% at -33.7%. |
| Leadership handoff after a bad earnings reaction: the strategy's largest holding dropped from the stock book for 20 sessions after its share price fell relative to the Nasdaq on its earnings release, so the book rotates into the next leader, on the Oct 14-22 rules | -14.16pp CAGR vs the Oct 14-22 rules (Oct 14 rules); window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward (also: Negative in the fresh era (2022 onward)) | When the book's largest name reacted badly to its earnings release (the strategy already trims the whole stock book then), also dropping that company for the next 20 sessions so the book rotated into the next-ranked leader cut CAGR from 162.0% to 147.8% and the fixed-January walk-forward from 160.4% to 148.3% (122.0% vs 128.2% with 2020 left out), deepened the worst drawdown (-55.1% vs -52.0%) and cost 32pp in the 2022-onward era; it won only 38% of the rolling four-year windows, and the same exclusion moved 40 sessions later lost about as much (walk-forward 150.5%), so the cost is the forced rotation out of the leader rather than anything tied to the release. |
| Fundamentally confirmed leadership score: the strategy's trend ranking blended half and half with a ranking of each company's past-year revenue and earnings growth as first reported, on the Oct 14-22 rules | -78.27pp CAGR vs the Oct 14-22 rules (Oct 14 rules); window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Ranking names half on the strategy's own price trend and half on how fast their revenue and earnings had grown over the past year (as first reported, used only after each filing), to pick fundamentally backed leaders earlier, shared fewer than half of its top four candidates with the trend ranking and cut CAGR from 162.0% to 83.7% and the fixed-January walk-forward from 160.4% to 82.1%, with a deeper worst drawdown (-67.2% vs -52.0%); it won none of the rolling four-year windows, and the same blend with the growth half held neutral cost only 5pp, so the loss came from the growth ranking itself. |
| Fed balance-sheet expansion as a TQQQ re-entry state: the leveraged Nasdaq sleeve switched back on while its volatility gate is off whenever the Federal Reserve's total assets had grown more than 5% over the last 13 weeks, on the Oct 14-22 rules | +2.21pp CAGR vs the Oct 14-22 rules (Oct 14 rules); window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Concentration (a few names or years carry the result) (also: Failed the walk-forward) | Switching the leveraged Nasdaq sleeve back on during a volatility exit whenever the Federal Reserve's balance sheet was expanding fast (more than 5% in 13 weeks, read only after each weekly release) added 2.2pp of CAGR (164.2% vs 162.0%) and 2.3pp to the fixed-January walk-forward (162.7% vs 160.4%), but every re-entry inside the walk-forward windows fell in the spring 2020 crash: with 2020 left out the walk-forward is unchanged to the decimal, and the change won only 44% of the rolling four-year windows (it lost none; the rest were identical), short of the 60% required. |
| Systematic-share sizing: the stock book scaled between 0.75x and 1.25x by how much of its holdings' last quarter of moves was market- and factor-driven rather than unexplained, on the Oct 14-22 rules | -10.88pp CAGR vs the Oct 14-22 rules (Oct 14 rules); window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the exposure-matched check (also: Failed the walk-forward) | Sizing the stock book up when its holdings' recent gains were mostly explained by market factors (expected to continue) and down when they were mostly unexplained (expected to reverse) cut CAGR from 162.0% to 151.1% and the fixed-January walk-forward from 160.4% to 149.8%, below a constant scale of the same average size (159.1%), with a deeper worst drawdown (-54.5% vs -52.0%) and 16 margin breaches on the headline model against 6; it won none of the rolling four-year windows. |
| Systematic-only momentum: the strategy's trend ranking replaced by each name's past six months of market- and factor-driven return only, with the unexplained part left out, on the Oct 14-22 rules | -106.63pp CAGR vs the Oct 14-22 rules (Oct 14 rules); window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Ranking names by the part of their last six months of returns explained by five statistical market factors (and by earnings-release days), instead of the strategy's own trend measure, a test of the research finding that such moves continue while unexplained moves reverse, cut CAGR from 162.0% to 55.4% and the fixed-January walk-forward from 160.4% to 51.2%, with a deeper worst drawdown (-63.2% vs -52.0%); it beat the strategy in under 1% of rolling four-year windows. |
| Cash-burn exclusion: names whose cash share of assets fell most over the past year (the bottom fifth of the universe) made ineligible, on the Oct 14-22 rules | -57.92pp CAGR vs the Oct 14-22 rules (Oct 14 rules); window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Excluding, every day, the fifth of the universe whose cash had fallen most as a share of assets over the past year (a genuine cash-flow signal, not disguised asset growth) changed the lead name on about half of rebalances and cut CAGR from 162.0% to 104.1% and the fixed-January walk-forward from 160.4% to 114.8%, with a deeper worst drawdown (-76.1% vs -52.0%) and one more margin breach on the headline model; it trailed the strategy in 11 of 17 years. |
| Credit-conditioned cash filter: the strategy's cash-and-distress screen applied only while the Baa corporate spread is above its one-year median, on the Oct 14-22 rules | -40.68pp CAGR vs the Oct 14-22 rules (Oct 14 rules); window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Switching the cash-and-distress screen off whenever credit was easier than its one-year median (57% of days) changed the lead name on a third of rebalances and cut CAGR from 162.0% to 121.3% and the fixed-January walk-forward from 160.4% to 133.2%, with a deeper worst drawdown (-67.6% vs -52.0%); it trailed in 14 of 17 years and won 3% of rolling four-year windows. |
| Volatility-conditioned growth filter: the strategy's revenue-acceleration screen applied only while VIX is below its one-year median, on the Oct 14-22 rules | -68.61pp CAGR vs the Oct 14-22 rules (Oct 14 rules); window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Switching the revenue-acceleration screen off whenever VIX was above its one-year median (44% of days), a re-test of an earlier regime-switched quality filter that had passed a walk-forward on an older version of the strategy, cut CAGR from 162.0% to 93.4% and the fixed-January walk-forward from 160.4% to 66.8%, and deepened the worst drawdown to -93.4%; 2020 alone was 513 points behind. |
| Both screens state-conditioned: the cash-and-distress screen on credit stress and the revenue-acceleration screen on VIX, together, on the Oct 14-22 rules | -88.50pp CAGR vs the Oct 14-22 rules (Oct 14 rules); window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Conditioning both screens at once cut CAGR from 162.0% to 73.5% and the fixed-January walk-forward from 160.4% to 62.9%, with a worst drawdown of -87.3%, and lost every rolling four-year window: the two conditionings did not offset each other. |
| Rate-duration exclusion: names whose returns fall most when 10-year yields rise (the bottom fifth of the universe's market-adjusted beta to yield changes) made ineligible, on the Oct 14-22 rules | -86.88pp CAGR vs the Oct 14-22 rules (Oct 14 rules); window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Excluding, every day, the fifth of the universe whose returns had fallen most with rising 10-year yields over the past year changed the lead name on about two thirds of rebalances and cut CAGR from 162.0% to 75.1% and the fixed-January walk-forward from 160.4% to 61.4%; the worst drawdown deepened from -52.0% to -81.1%, and it did not even protect the book in 2022, the rate shock it was built around (-44.4 points that year), trailing the strategy in 15 of 17 years and every rolling four-year window. |
| Dollar-volume lead: the stock sleeves' market-cap weights re-sized by each name's 60-session median dollar volume instead of its market value, on the Oct 14-22 rules | +1.82pp CAGR vs the Oct 14-22 rules (Oct 14 rules); window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward (also: Negative in the fresh era (2022 onward)) | Keeping the same selected names and the same concentration, but sizing them by recent trading value instead of market value, changed the lead name on 35% of rebalances and added 1.8pp of CAGR (163.8% vs 162.0%), yet the fixed-January walk-forward fell 9.2pp (151.2% vs 160.4%), 2022 onward fell 48.4pp, the worst drawdown deepened from -52.0% to -65.6% (-66.2% on the headline model) and headline margin breaches rose from 6 to 17; it trailed most in 2020 and 2024. |
| Revenue lead: the stock sleeves' market-cap weights re-sized by each name's trailing-four-quarter revenue instead of its market value, on the Oct 14-22 rules | -100.99pp CAGR vs the Oct 14-22 rules (Oct 14 rules); window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Sizing the same selected names by trailing revenue (as first reported, point in time) instead of market value changed the lead name on 63% of rebalances and cut CAGR from 162.0% to 61.0% and the fixed-January walk-forward from 160.4% to 48.9%; it was pre-registered also as a drawdown guard, but the worst drawdown deepened from -52.0% to -67.8%, and it trailed the strategy in 13 of 17 calendar years and in every rolling four-year window. |
| Item 1.02 exclusion (252 sessions) on the Oct 13 starting rules | +4.14pp CAGR vs the Oct 13 starting rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Concentration (a few names or years carry the result) (also: Negative in the fresh era (2022 onward)) | Excluding Item 1.02 names for 252 sessions added +4.14pp CAGR on the Oct 13 starting rules (111.36% vs 107.22%), but fresh 2022+ was -0.42pp and leave-one-ticker-out showed the gain was an ALGN slot-reallocation artifact of the market-cap weighting plus NVDA (excluding ALGN keeps 44% of the gain, NVDA 58%, MU 82%), with DSR 0.007. |
| Item 3.02 unregistered-sale exclusion on event-rotation | +0.66pp CAGR vs event-rotation finalist; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Dropped by decision (also: Concentration (a few names or years carry the result)) | Excluding Item 3.02 names added +0.66pp CAGR and +1.04pp fixed-January walk-forward on the event-rotation finalist, but AMD carried 88.3% and MELI 87.0% of the gain in leave-one-ticker-out (each individually necessary) and the shifted placebo read z +0.42 (8 of 24 displaced masks match or beat the treatment); dropped by decision on 2026-10-13. |
| Stale high-coverage negative-surprise avoidance on the Oct 14-22 rules | -6.14pp CAGR vs event-rotation finalist; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Avoiding stale high-coverage negative earnings surprises cost -6.14pp CAGR on the Oct 14-22 rules (fixed-January walk-forward 103.67% vs 115.13%, rolling four-year mean -9.06pp, fresh 2022+ -6.29pp, protocol WF picked delta -9.50pp), confirming the rejection already recorded on Oct 11 rules. |
| Congressional-cluster exclusion (3+ members buying, 30 days) on Oct 11 rules | -3.37pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward (also: Negative in the fresh era (2022 onward)) | Excluding congressional-cluster names cost -3.37pp CAGR on Oct 11 rules (92.88% vs 96.25%) with MaxDD -59.60% vs -57.38% and -4.09pp on the 2012-07-27 data sub-period; an independent check on the Oct 11 rules build read +0.1pp full-period with fresh 2022+ -4.1pp and January walk-forward 72.3% vs 72.4%. |
| Negative EPS surprise exclusion; SUE variant | +0.20pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Negative in the fresh era (2022 onward) | Excluding negative EPS surprises added +0.2pp CAGR on Oct 11 rules (SUE variant +2.9pp), but fresh 2022+ was -3.5pp (SUE -4.0pp) and January walk-forward read 69.0% / 70.6% vs the 72.4% control, with DSR 0.02 / 0.09. |
| Congressional-cluster plus negative-EPS-surprise combo exclusion | +1.50pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | The congressional-cluster plus EPS-surprise combination added +1.5pp CAGR on Oct 11 rules (Robinhood; +4.1pp on the headline model), but fresh 2022+ was -0.9pp, January walk-forward read 70.3% vs 72.4%, and every 4y-fold walk-forward fold that picked it lost on test (-4.7 / -0.6 / -3.7pp). |
| High-coverage consensus-miss exclusion | -1.60pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules (independent-check build); window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed independent replication | The high-coverage consensus-miss exclusion lost -1.6pp CAGR on Oct 11 rules (88.2% vs 89.8%) with train -4.7pp and January walk-forward 74.8% vs 75.6% (picked 1/12 folds), and the originating claim (99.42% CAGR, walk-forward +12.10pp) does not reproduce on this build. |
| Large negative earnings-reaction exclusion (prior-day reaction <= -10%) | +5.70pp CAGR vs the Oct 13 starting rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Concentration (a few names or years carry the result) | Excluding names after a large negative earnings reaction (EAR <= -10% vs SPY, 20 sessions) added +5.7pp CAGR on the Oct 13 starting rules (112.9% vs 107.2%), but MaxDD deepened to -64.3% vs -59.4%, the -10% threshold was a spike (the -7% and -15% neighbours read -0.1pp and -0.7pp, and the spike point's own fresh era was negative), and the sold names beat SPY by +2.5% over the next 20 sessions with a per-exit edge median of -2.2%. |
| Held-name GAF keep rule (sell a held name the day it loses GAF) | -20.80pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Negative in the fresh era (2022 onward) | Keeping held names that lose GAF eligibility cost -20.8pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules (73.9% vs 94.8%) with fresh 2022+ -37.0pp, every neighbour and every anchor losing and DSR 0.00; the mask pays as an admission rule and destroys value as an exit rule. |
| Margin-binding fill priority (cause-aware fills when margin binds) | -3.20pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Cause-aware fill priority when margin binds cost -3.2pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules at the primary (91.6% vs 94.8%) with a 4y win rate of 1% and switch score 1/10, and the plain binding-day variant (+0.3pp) also failed. |
| Receivables / net-working-capital rank tilt | -29.30pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed independent replication | The receivables / net-working-capital rank tilt lost -29.3pp CAGR vs the Oct 11 rules in the independent implementation (65.5% vs 94.8%), not reproducing the original +9.64pp rolling four-year mean claimed in-sample; an exact second build traced 29.1 of the 29.4pp gap to switching from percentile ranks to raw z-scores, and that second build read +0.1pp with the walk-forward picking the control in 4 of 4 folds. |
| Receivables-level rank tilt | +10.51pp rolling four-year mean CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward (also: Concentration (a few names or years carry the result)) | The receivables-level rank tilt gained +10.51pp in the rolling four-year mean in-sample vs the Oct 11 rules, but the walk-forward picked it in only 3 of 5 folds against a 4-of-5 bar, with its +8.99pp out-of-sample mean concentrated in the fourth and fifth folds (+33.68/+12.03pp), and the third fold's pick lost -0.74pp. |
| Bipower (jump-robust) volatility target | -1.00pp CAGR vs the Oct 13 starting rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Negative in the fresh era (2022 onward) | Replacing the realized-vol estimator with a jump-robust bipower estimator cost -1.0pp CAGR vs the Oct 13 starting rules (106.2% vs 107.2%) with fresh 2022+ -3.5pp, every variant losing and DSR 0.017. |
| Correction-state rotation pause (corr-pause) | +1.00pp CAGR vs event-rotation finalist; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Concentration (a few names or years carry the result) | Pausing event-row rank exits in correction states added +1.00pp CAGR vs the event-rotation finalist (123.81% vs 122.81%; fixed-Jan 115.2%), but the neighbours failed (fast-10 -2.09pp, fast-42 -0.08pp, SPY-reference +0.24pp), 4y windows failed, the literal GHM split read -7.16pp, and the gain was five episodes with 2020 alone contributing -27.0pp from a paused switch (DSR 0.010). |
| Event rotation on the buffer-7 book | -4.78pp CAGR vs event-rotation finalist; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Running the event-rotation event rotation on the buffer-7 book lost -4.78pp CAGR vs the Oct 14-22 rules (119.66% vs 124.43%); fixed-January walk-forward rose +1.10pp to 116.23% but the adoption battery failed (rolling four-year median -10.39pp, MaxDD -64.27%, headline-model breaches 4 vs 2, train -11.12pp against fresh +17.09pp), so the live buffer stays. |
| Event-row local re-weighting (cross-check) | -3.30pp CAGR vs event-rotation finalist; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Mechanism overlap | Re-weighting locally at event rows lost -3.30pp CAGR vs the finalist (121.13% vs 124.43%) with fixed-January walk-forward 108.39% (-6.74pp) and fresh 2022+ -13.20pp, even though it retained 80.6% of the finalist's edge over the Oct 13 starting rules and shallowed MaxDD by 8.58pp: full re-concentration at event rows was load-bearing, not a cost. |
| GAF/DC mask dated at the 8-K release, on the Oct 14-22 rules | -19.66pp CAGR vs event-rotation finalist; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Dating the GAF/DC mask at the 8-K release instead of the filing date cost -19.66pp CAGR on the Oct 14-22 rules (104.49% vs 124.15%) with fresh 2022+ -32.81pp, switch score 0/10, anchors -17 to -21pp and DSR 0.000; filing-date availability is the correct dating. |
| GAF/DC mask dated at the 8-K release, original Oct 11 rules study | +3.40pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward (also: Failed the placebo check) | Dating the GAF/DC mask at the 8-K release added +3.4pp CAGR headline on Oct 11 rules (98.2% vs 94.8%) but failed the drawdown leg (MaxDD -62.6% vs -57.3%) and the causal-family January walk-forward (76.9% vs 80.2%), while its strong neighbours (max30 +7.9pp, max15 +2.6pp) failed the shuffle check as look-ahead artefacts. |
| More / faster stock sleeves on the Oct 14-22 rules | -1.72pp CAGR vs event-rotation finalist; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | More or faster stock sleeves lost -1.72pp CAGR at the primary on the Oct 14-22 rules (122.43%), every variant lost full-period CAGR (-0.57 to -5.78pp), the family January walk-forward picked Surge in 11/12 folds, and DSR was <= 0.008; four sleeves at the current cadence is the best point in the tested family. |
| event-rotation sibling families (dominated rotation forms) | No single primary delta (the sources record a range across variants) | Mechanism overlap | The dominated event-rotation rotation families all lost to the adopted conjunction (a rank buffer, a statistical margin on the replacement test, eligibility rules and rank-based exits) on the decision metrics, vs the Oct 13 starting rules: exit persistence -1.7 to -12.8pp CAGR at every K/B, release-day-only checks -5.6 to -14.0pp, the conjunction -4.4pp, and sleeve-count variants -5.2 to +0.8pp. |
| 52-week-high proximity (filter and rank tilt) | -11.50pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | The 52-week-high proximity filter cost -11.5pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules (83.3% vs 94.8%) and the rank tilt -19.4pp (train -25.7pp), with every proximity threshold losing (-2.2 to -20.2pp). |
| ATR trailing stops | -29.50pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Negative in the fresh era (2022 onward) | ATR trailing stops cost -29.5pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules in the all-held-names form (65.3%) and -31.1pp in the top-name-only form, with fresh 2022+ -59.5pp / -63.1pp and roughly 1,600 whipsaw exits in the all-held-names form. |
| Index-inclusion drift A (pre-inclusion admission) | +0.20pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Concentration (a few names or years carry the result) | Admitting names shortly before index inclusion added +0.2pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules, but the entire effect was one year (2024 +36.9pp) and January walk-forward was a tie. |
| Index-inclusion drift B (post-inclusion penalty) | -10.00pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Penalising recently included names cost -10.0pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules with a 4y win rate of 1%, and every penalty size lost (-4 to -13pp). |
| Index-membership seasoning and lingering | -10.62pp rolling four-year mean CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Excluding a name's first 63 sessions in the index (season63) cost -10.62pp rolling four-year mean vs Oct 11 rules (the displaced placebo, sessions 126-189, cost -4.52pp, so about -6pp is event timing), while extending eligibility 63 sessions past removal (linger63) was noise at +0.30pp rolling four-year mean. |
| Multi-horizon return rank | -2.20pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | The multi-horizon return rank lost -2.2pp CAGR at the primary vs Oct 11 rules, and its post-hoc small tilts (+5.9/+6.7pp) existed only at the live anchor, reading -1.5 to +2.4pp across shifted anchors with train negative in 9 of 12 shifted cells. |
| Conviction concentration (raise the weight of top-conviction names) | -28.20pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Concentrating into top-conviction names cost -28.2pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules, every variant lost (-19.7 to -35.2pp), and the 4y win rate was 3%; the current market-cap weighting already concentrates as much as pays. |
| Prior-year winners satellite | +1.70pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Concentration (a few names or years carry the result) | The prior-year winners satellite added +1.7pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules but failed the drawdown leg (MaxDD -59.8% vs -57.3%), its response was monotone in k (a leverage dial, not a selection effect), and family WF picked losers, then max-k. |
| Universe breadth brake | -4.80pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | The universe breadth brake cost -4.8pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules, every neighbour lost, and the cost concentrated in V-shaped recoveries (2020: -68pp of that year). |
| Entry-timing filter (skip new buys when the 5-day average is falling) | -10.00pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Negative in the fresh era (2022 onward) | Skipping new buys while a name's 5-day average was falling cost -10.0pp CAGR vs the Oct 11 rules, -18.1pp from 2022 onward, and the reverse rule lost too (-23.0pp). |
| QQQ trend gate for the TQQQ sleeve (AGITQ) | No single primary delta (the sources record a range across variants) | Failed the walk-forward | QQQ trend-gate variants for the TQQQ sleeve lost -2.2 to -4.8pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules, and walk-forward picked the control 12/12 in every family. |
| Trim top name before earnings | -16.10pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Negative in the fresh era (2022 onward) | Trimming the top name before earnings cost -16.1pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules with fresh 2022+ -30.5pp, and every neighbour lost. |
| Insider-buying clusters | +0.20pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Negative in the fresh era (2022 onward) | Insider-buying clusters added +0.2pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules with fresh 2022+ -2.4pp, and the signal touched 0.002% of book weight; Form 4 cluster forms tested separately (batches 40/41) were flat in avoidance form and catastrophic in require form (-27.5 to -39.8pp). |
| 13F institutional-ownership tiebreaker | -6.20pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | The 13F institutional-ownership tiebreaker cost -6.2pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules, and every neighbour lost. |
| Buyback shrink tiebreaker | -4.30pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | The buyback shrink tiebreaker cost -4.3pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules, and every neighbour and every anchor lost. |
| Supplier-to-customer spillover tiebreaker | -3.10pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Negative in the fresh era (2022 onward) | The supplier-to-customer spillover tiebreaker cost -3.1pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules with fresh 2022+ -9.8pp, and the dose-response was monotone worse in the spillover weight. |
| EDGAR lazy prices (filing-attention tiebreaker) | -25.50pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | The EDGAR lazy-prices tiebreaker cost -25.5pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules with a 4y win rate of 7%. |
| Peer lead-lag tiebreaker | -5.90pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | The peer lead-lag tiebreaker cost -5.9pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules, and both signs lost. |
| Volume-confirmed momentum tiebreaker | -15.20pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Negative in the fresh era (2022 onward) | The volume-confirmed momentum tiebreaker cost -15.2pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules with fresh 2022+ -19.3pp, and every form lost. |
| Parking in gold (GLD) while the gate is off (family) | +1.50pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed independent replication (also: Negative in the fresh era (2022 onward)) | Parking in GLD while the gate was off (first form) passed the originator's bar narrowly (+1.5pp CAGR vs the Oct 11 rules), but independent validation read +2.24pp out-of-sample in 3 of 5 folds, below the +3pp bar, with a worse maximum drawdown; the form that held GLD only above its 200-day average read +0.4pp, the Treasury-bond (TLT) forms +0.6/+0.6pp with -2.0/-1.0pp from 2022 onward, and the blends +1.1/+1.0pp. |
| BTAL hedge satellite | +1.00pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Concentration (a few names or years carry the result) | The BTAL hedge satellite added +1.0pp CAGR at the primary vs Oct 11 rules, but two-way walk-forward lost at every anchor and half the gain was the 2020 spell. |
| QQQ up-streak / IBS satellite; TRIN oversold satellite | +0.00pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | The QQQ up-streak / IBS satellite added +0.0pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules (the signal fires 0.84 times per year, too rare to matter at any tested size) and the TRIN oversold satellite lost -0.6pp. |
| Defensive satellites (VRP; defensive TSMOM sleeve; GLD volume-breakout; post-bear re-risk; momentum-factor trend brake) | -0.30pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Negative in the fresh era (2022 onward) | Five defensive satellites all lost vs Oct 11 rules: VRP -0.3pp, defensive TSMOM sleeve -2.1pp, GLD volume-breakout -2.0pp, post-bear re-risk -0.1pp and momentum-factor trend brake -5.8pp CAGR, with fresh 2022+ deltas of -2.1 / -5.3 / -3.5 / -3.0 / -9.5pp respectively. |
| High-water-mark circuit-breaker overlay | -15.40pp walk-forward out-of-sample mean vs retired base; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-09-18; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | The high-water-mark circuit-breaker overlay lost -15.4pp in walk-forward out-of-sample mean CAGR (46.71% vs the base's 62.08%); training-only selection picked the same variant (a 35% trigger with a 30% repair) in 5 of 5 folds and it still lost out-of-sample, while in-sample all 9 trigger-and-repair variants lost 23-37pp CAGR for at most 7pp of drawdown relief. |
| Sleeve-structure variants on Oct 11 rules | -5.49pp rolling four-year mean CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Across 22 sleeve-structure variants in batches 49-50, none cleared the +3pp bar vs Oct 11 rules: TQQQ/QQQ barbell -5.49pp rolling four-year mean, TQQQ vol target -2.45pp, SSO parking -2.11pp, stock-book state trims -1.47 to -3.17pp, sleeve sub-state refinements -0.15 to -0.70pp, and never-fully-exit-the-sleeve -8.68pp. |
| Short sleeves A and B (weakest-names short book) | -1.00pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward (also: Negative in the fresh era (2022 onward)) | The always-on short sleeve (A) lost -1.0pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules (93.8% vs 94.8%) with every k/N/rank neighbour losing on the full period and on train, and the gate-off-only sleeve (B) lost -0.2pp and was negative in 2022+ at all anchor offsets. |
| State gates on the TQQQ sleeve (7 families, 24 registered forms) | -10.18pp rolling four-year mean CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Seven families of TQQQ-sleeve state gates produced no viable form in 24 registered forms: main-form changes in the rolling four-year mean vs the Oct 11 rules were high-yield credit spread level -10.18pp, the VIX against 3-month VIX term structure -9.82pp, the Cboe SKEW index +0.15pp, VVIX -7.19pp, the MOVE bond-volatility index -4.99pp, market breadth -5.35pp and the 10-year minus 2-year Treasury spread -5.19pp, with the reverse rules worse than the main forms in every family. |
| Price-path and risk-shape tilts (18 constructs) | No single primary delta (the sources record a range across variants) | Failed the walk-forward | Eighteen price-path and risk-shape tilts all failed vs Oct 11 rules: the first batch's 12 tilts read -15.44 to -39.21pp rolling four-year mean, close-location persistence -18.53pp (prefer-high) / -18.05pp (prefer-low), overnight-gap asymmetry -31.89 / -35.07pp and up-day balance -22.54 / -40.27pp, none within 15pp of the +3pp bar, so no walk-forward was run. |
| Rank-age and clock tilts (trend age; information age; earnings-clock phase) | -40.25pp rolling four-year mean CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Rank-age and clock tilts failed in both directions vs Oct 11 rules: trend age -40.25pp (prefer-young) / -22.58pp (prefer-old) rolling four-year mean, information age -29.01 / -21.64pp, and earnings-clock phase -31.37 / -22.08pp. |
| Dollar-index and put/call market gates | -0.14pp rolling four-year mean CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | The dollar-index gate was a wash vs Oct 11 rules (-0.14pp rolling four-year mean, binding on 6.5% of defined sessions, MaxDD -59.25% vs -57.38%) and the aggregate put/call gates lost in both directions (-5.01pp contrarian, -8.47pp calm) on the covered span (the put/call archive ends 2019-10-04). |
| EDGAR 8-K event exclusions (non-distress items) | -14.01pp rolling four-year mean CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | EDGAR 8-K non-distress exclusions lost vs Oct 11 rules: Item 5.02 departures -14.01pp rolling four-year mean (binding on 16.5% of eligible cells, mostly routine governance), Item 1.01 agreements -12.46pp and Item 2.01 completions -3.73pp. |
| EDGAR regulatory-distress and timeliness exclusions (Items 4.02 / 4.01 / 3.01 / 1.03; NT and late filings) | +0.00pp rolling four-year mean CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | EDGAR distress and timeliness exclusions were inert or negative vs Oct 11 rules: Items 4.02, 1.03 and NT/late filings read +0.00pp rolling four-year mean (bit-identical to control, because a flagged name is never at the top of the rank inside the buffer), Item 4.01 -0.01pp, and Item 3.01 -0.74pp CAGR with MaxDD -65.37% vs -57.38%. |
| Schedule 13D / 13G eligibility boost | -1.55pp rolling four-year mean CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | The Schedule 13D / 13G eligibility boost lost vs Oct 11 rules (13D -1.55pp, 13D/A -1.10pp, 13G -1.94pp rolling four-year mean): the boost binds but the admitted names underperform the names they displace, and tails worsen. |
| Event sleeves on the early-October combined base (PEAD; 13D activist; 13G passive) | -9.34pp rolling four-year mean CAGR vs matched 5-sleeve all-momentum control; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Event sleeves on the early-October combined base all lost vs the matched 5-sleeve all-momentum control (92.06%): PEAD -9.34pp, 13D activist -12.31pp and 13G passive -9.46pp rolling four-year mean, negative across the whole rolling distribution (medians -7.46 / -13.56 / -11.48pp) with pick overlap of only 0.4-3.7%. |
| Corporate-action exclusions (corporate-actions feed) | -9.67pp rolling four-year mean CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Excluding names after corporate actions from the corporate-actions feed all lost vs the Oct 11 rules: forward splits -9.67pp in the rolling four-year mean, dividend initiations -3.70pp, dividend increases -11.78pp, cuts or omissions -9.98pp, high trailing yield -10.22pp and low trailing yield -14.66pp, with shifted-date placebos (-1.62pp splits, -3.46pp negative events) showing the damage comes from the events themselves. |
| Universe expansion to liquid names outside the index | -29.00pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Expanding the universe to liquid names outside the index cost -29.0pp CAGR vs the Oct 11 rules in the main form (72.2%), with maximum drawdown -73.8%, fixed-January delta -25.3pp and the walk-forward picking the candidate in 0 of 12 years; the two other forms were worse (-54.1pp and -42.2pp). |
| Universe widening to the top 1,500 companies by market value | -30.07pp rolling four-year mean CAGR vs the early-October combined base; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Widening the universe to the 1,500 largest companies at each date lost -30.07pp in the rolling four-year mean vs the early-October combined base (CAGR -29.15pp to 69.55%, maximum drawdown -73.55%); the walk-forward picked the candidate in 0 of 5 folds, training CAGR was lower in all 5 folds, and the control rebuilt through the extended pipeline reproduced to within 0.004pp. |
| PIT top-500 universe trim | -21.40pp CAGR vs event-rotation finalist; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | The PIT top-500 universe trim lost -21.40pp CAGR on the Oct 14-22 rules (103.03% vs 124.43%; fixed-January walk-forward 101.02% vs 115.13%) after failing the protocol WF in its first test (picked 2/5 folds, out-of-sample picked delta -5.57pp, gain era-concentrated); on Surge it also cleared all margin breaches (0/0/0) and shallowed MaxDD by 6.94pp, a genuine risk-reducer at the price of a fifth of the return. |
| Winner-mimicry (kNN 'looks like a past winner') and concentration requirements | -22.46pp rolling four-year mean CAGR vs retired base; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-09-18; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Winner-mimicry and winner-profile requirements failed vs the retired base: kNN 'looks like a past winner' forms read -22.46 to -35.15pp rolling four-year mean across 7 forms, and the first-profit, turnaround and jumper requirements cost -42.85pp, -36.54pp and -28.07pp. |
| Winner-autopsy masks (operating leverage; momentum-earnings divergence) | -3.50pp rolling four-year mean CAGR vs retired base; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-09-18; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Both masks proposed by the top-20 winner autopsy failed in-sample vs the retired base, so no walk-forward was run: the operating-leverage mask -3.50pp rolling four-year mean (-6.15pp CAGR) and the momentum-earnings-divergence mask -22.23pp (-28.24pp CAGR, MaxDD -78.6%). |
| Published factors (Whited-Wu; org capital; Amihud) | -41.60pp rolling four-year mean CAGR vs published-factor test base; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-09-18; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Published factor batch 14 failed on the published-factor test base: Whited-Wu -41.6pp rolling four-year mean, org capital -33.6pp and Amihud illiquidity -27.1pp, and the remaining members also failed (R&D growth -21.0pp, coskewness -17.0pp, LT reversal -12.3pp, KZ index -4.6pp). |
| Pair trades (4 families) | +2.60pp rolling four-year mean CAGR: none (absolute; 75% rolling four-year mean adoption bar); window 2010-02-11 to 2026-09-18; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Four pair-trade families failed the 75% rolling four-year mean adoption bar: the best form (long-short 12-month momentum) returned +2.6% rolling four-year mean on its own, 72pp short of the bar and 16pp short of QQQ on the same windows, with cointegration pairs -2.0%, reversal -14.2% and sector-neutral -11.0%. |
| Insider-buying spike as a TQQQ FAST re-entry trigger (on the Oct 13 rules) | -2.64pp CAGR vs the Oct 13 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward (also: Concentration (a few names or years carry the result)) | Sending the TQQQ sleeve to FAST on an aggregate insider-buying spike lost -2.64pp CAGR vs the Oct 13 rules on the current starting account (135.38% vs 138.02%), with MaxDD 4.41pp deeper (-58.80%), fixed-January walk-forward 124.55% vs 128.72%, switch 4/10 / 5/10 and DSR 0.000 - all ten bar items fail; the loss is the 2020 spell (the trigger bought TQQQ eight sessions before QQQ's closing low; leave-2020-out is +0.41pp), and the literal OR-with-D form is a no-op against D's entry guard. |
| Prior-calendar-year winners satellite revisited on the Oct 13 rules (in-engine) | -1.32pp CAGR vs the Oct 13 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the placebo check | Re-run inside the engine on the Oct 13 rules, the prior-year top-5 winners satellite (weight 0.10, January rebalance) lost -1.32pp CAGR (136.99% vs 138.31%) with train -1.29pp and fresh 2022+ -1.76pp, and the exposure-matched mid-5 placebo (-1.11pp) and the losers sign check (-1.26pp) lost the same amount, so there is no winner effect; MaxDD passed both drawdown bars (-54.36%) but headline-model breaches rose 2 to 3, initial margin bound on 14 of 17 satellite fills (mean buy fraction 0.32, zero in 8 of 17 years), and the 2026-10-12 overlay near-miss on Oct 11 rules was its unlimited margin. |
| DRAM nowcast mask (Taiwan memory-maker revenue) on the Oct 14-22 rules | -0.71pp CAGR vs event-rotation finalist; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the placebo check (also: Failed the walk-forward) | Masking memory / storage names while the Nanya + Winbond revenue nowcast decelerated lost -0.71pp CAGR vs the Oct 14-22 rules (123.44% vs 124.15%) with fresh 2022+ -3.63pp, fixed-January walk-forward 113.38% vs 114.91% and switch 4/10 / 4/10, and the 6-months-late placebo gained +6.30pp - more than any real variant (neighbours -10.69 to +6.23pp) - so the deltas are selection-path divergence, not signal timing; the mask did exit MU before its 2024 fall, and the sleeve refill lost as much in the same sell-off. |
| Implied-correlation TQQQ boost, on the event-rotation finalist | +1.75pp CAGR vs event-rotation finalist; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Raising the TQQQ sleeve weight from 0.5 to 0.75 while Cboe's three-month implied correlation index sat at or above its trailing 80th percentile gained +1.75pp CAGR (125.90%) but failed the bar: fixed-January walk-forward 114.24% vs 114.91%, a four-year win rate of 39%, switch tests 6/10 and 5/10, and headline-model breaches 8 vs 2; crowded margin meant realised TQQQ exposure rose only +0.09 of the planned +0.25, and the same-exposure swap form lost -1.92pp and failed every check. |
| Flow-pressure tilt (60/40 drift + leveraged-ETF flows) on the Oct 14-22 rules | +0.69pp CAGR vs event-rotation finalist; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Negative in the fresh era (2022 onward) (also: Failed the walk-forward) | Scaling the stock book x1.5 / x0.5 on a combined 60/40-drift and leveraged-ETF flow-pressure state added +0.69pp CAGR vs the Oct 14-22 rules but lost -5.53pp on fresh 2022+, won 21% of 4y windows and read fixed-January walk-forward 111.44% vs 114.91% (7 of 10 bar items missed, DSR 0.000); the flow component alone lost -15.44pp, the TQQQ-k form's +1.95pp was all fresh-era with headline-model breaches 5 vs 2, and on the rules with admission the primary lost -0.36pp (not additive). A post-hoc up-only half (+5.76pp) is a lead for a fresh test, not part of this verdict. |
| X claim: buy last month's top stock, rotate monthly | -4.30pp CAGR: none (absolute standalone; SPY +14.5% on the same dates); window 2010-01-29 to 2026-09-30; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed independent replication | Tested honestly (point-in-time S&P 500 + Nasdaq-100 universe, 5 bps/side), the claimed rule - 100% in the prior month's single best performer, rotated monthly - returned -4.3% CAGR with MaxDD -85.7% (SPY +14.5% / -33.7% on the same dates); the claim's 33.9% comes from a survivorship universe with no costs. The best honest form (top-10) read 14.1% / -42.7%, anchored-Jan walk-forward over the variants read 8.3% vs SPY 13.5%, and as a satellite on the early-October combined base (101.17% control) the top-K books cost -4.4 to -10.8pp. |
| Gate-off breakout sleeves A/B (TQQQ weight 0.5 / QQQ weight 1.5 after a QQQ 50-day high) | +0.20pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward (also: Concentration (a few names or years carry the result)) | Holding TQQQ (A, weight 0.5) or QQQ (B, weight 1.5) for one session after a QQQ 50-day closing high inside a gate-off spell added +0.2pp (A) / +0.1pp (B) CAGR vs Oct 11 rules, but A failed fresh 2022+ (-0.2pp), the 4y win rate (32%) and January walk-forward (80.0% vs 80.2%), and B's 4y win was 50%, not above it; the signal fired on only 7 of 392 gate-off sessions, A's gain is the single May-2020 episode, and where it fires more (20-day highs) it loses -0.6pp. |
| Turn-of-month TQQQ boost (extra weight 0.25 leg, gate on, 2/2 window) | -2.60pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | An extra TQQQ leg (weight 0.25) over the last two and first two sessions of each month, while the gate was on, cost -2.6pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules (92.2% vs 94.8%) with fresh 2022+ -9.0pp, 4y win 43% and January walk-forward never picking it (family 77.4%); the weight 0.50 and 3/3-window neighbours lost -3.5 / -3.2pp, the 1/1 window's +0.3pp had train +0.0, and 2024 alone cost -54pp spread over Sep-Nov. |
| Turn-of-month gate-off sleeve (hold TQQQ weight 0.5 over the 2/2 window, gate off) | -0.70pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Holding the TQQQ sleeve (weight 0.5) over the turn-of-month window while the gate was off cost -0.7pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules with train -1.1pp and 4y win 41%, January walk-forward never picked it, and anchor shifts read -1.3 to -1.5pp with 4y win 17-19%; the QQQ weight 1.5 neighbour lost -0.4pp. The gate is off in high-volatility spells, and turn-of-month seasonality does not override it. |
| Options-expiration timing (TQQQ sleeve out the week after monthly opex) | -11.00pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Taking the TQQQ sleeve out for the week after monthly opex cost -11.0pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules (83.8%) with train -13.8pp, 4y win 1% and anchors -11 to -13pp; half-out cost -5.5pp and the opex-week sign check -5.2pp, so both the 'weak post-opex week' and 'strong opex week' claims lose - being out of TQQQ on any calendar slice costs the sleeve's carry. |
| LEAPS / leveraged-ETF overlays (deep-ITM calls for margin; LEAPS leverage; 2x single-stock ETFs) | -3.70pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules (same option-data dates, 96.0%); window 2010-02-11 to 2026-06-30; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Replacing margin with deep-ITM ~1y calls (delta 0.80) at the same exposure cost -3.7pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules on the option-data dates (92.3% vs 96.0%, real chains at bid/ask fills; -11.1pp with every name model-priced) - the interest saved is smaller than the time value and spread paid. The leverage forms are not alpha: LEAPS at weight 1.5 gained +17.6pp on the 12 archive names, but the hindsight-free all-names family January walk-forward read 72.4% vs 79.4% with MaxDD -72.4%, and 2x single-stock ETFs read +18.1pp with 32 Robinhood breaches and MaxDD -73.8%. |
| TQQQ dip-buy sleeve while the gate is off (oversold above the 200-day average) | -1.10pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Holding the TQQQ sleeve (weight 0.5) for 3 sessions after an oversold QQQ close (two-day RSI below 10, above its 200-day average) while the gate was off cost -1.1pp CAGR vs the Oct 11 rules (93.7%), with a four-year win rate of 0%, a January walk-forward of 78.8% vs 80.2% and -1.4 to -1.6pp at the start days; it fired on only 7 of 392 gate-off sessions, and 2020 dip buys cost -17 to -80pp a year across variants (deflated Sharpe ratio at most 0.07). |
| Lag7 laggard sleeve (long the weakest Magnificent-7 names) | +3.90pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the placebo check | A margin-financed sleeve on the two weakest Magnificent-7 names (weight 0.10) added +3.9pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules with 4y win 99%, but the leverage-matched all-7 reference gained +3.1pp and the leaders sign check +4.2pp - the laggards did not beat the wrong-name controls - the response is monotone in k (+2.0 / +3.9 / +7.7, a leverage dial), and the hindsight-free point-in-time top-7-by-cap basket read fresh 2022+ -0.5pp, failing the pre-registered bar; the gain is margin-financed beta on a hindsight-picked basket, not a laggard effect. |
| Sector dip-buy satellite after an SPY down day | -0.20pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Buying the two Select Sector SPDR funds with the best 12-month return (still above their 100-day average) for 10 sessions after an SPY fall of 1.5% or more (weight 0.15) cost -0.2pp CAGR vs the Oct 11 rules, -0.6pp in training; every neighbour lost in training, the family January walk-forward (80.8%) picked the weight-0.25 variant rather than the main one, and 2020 cost -20.8pp. |
| SPY deep-pullback satellite in an uptrend | +0.10pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Negative in the fresh era (2022 onward) | Holding an extra SPY sleeve (weight 0.10, 10 sessions) when SPY closed at its 15-session low with the weakest one-day return of those sessions while above its 200-day average added +0.1pp CAGR vs the Oct 11 rules but read -0.6pp from 2022 onward, with a four-year win rate of 44% and a January walk-forward of 80.2%, identical to the control; neighbours flipped sign (-0.2 to +0.3pp), the gate-off parking form lost -1.1pp (it bought SPY on 2-6 March 2020), and only 78 triggers fired after 2010 (deflated Sharpe ratio at most 0.05). |
| Momentum-crash brake (Daniel-Moskowitz bear state, stock book x0.5) | -0.60pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Halving the stock book while SPY's 24-month return was negative and the TQQQ gate was off cost -0.6pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules with 4y win 3% and January walk-forward picking the control 12/12; the state fired on only 33 sessions (2010 and 2020, never after 2021) and cost 2020 -27pp by cutting exposure into the leader-led rebound; the 12-month form read train -3.7pp and the bear-state-alone form -3.6pp. |
| Faster TQQQ re-entry, three rejected forms (short-window volatility; 20-day average trend; half weight) | +2.10pp CAGR vs Oct 11 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the earlier, larger starting account | Negative in the fresh era (2022 onward) (also: Failed the walk-forward) | Three faster TQQQ re-entry forms were rejected on the Oct 11 rules (a fourth form was adopted into the starting rules and is not listed): re-entering when 10-day volatility fell below 28% gained +2.1pp CAGR but -0.3pp in 2022 onward and a January walk-forward of 79.0% vs 80.2%, with its 15-day neighbour at -1.5pp; re-entering above the 20-day average lost -1.1pp, -3.2pp from 2022 onward; half weight on the first trigger gained +0.6pp but -1.0pp from 2022 onward and a January walk-forward of 78.6%. The faster volatility signal re-enters on short calm spells inside unfinished selloffs. |
| Turnover-conditioned short-term momentum tilt on the Oct 13 rules | -17.63pp CAGR vs the Oct 13 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward (also: Negative in the fresh era (2022 onward)) | Tilting the rank score toward the last month's winners among the top half of names by turnover lost -17.63pp CAGR vs the Oct 13 rules (120.39% vs 138.02%), with MaxDD 11.11pp deeper, fixed-January walk-forward 103.86% vs 128.72%, fresh 2022+ -26.30pp, a 4% four-year win rate and all four anchors negative; every neighbour lost as well, and the unconditional tilt (-15.73pp) beat the conditioned one, so the turnover conditioning added nothing - the book's leaders are themselves high-turnover names (the top name sits in the high-turnover half on 74.7% of rows), so the tilt acted on the book, not the margin. |
| Late-reporter exclusion on the Oct 13 rules | +1.69pp CAGR vs the Oct 13 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the current starting account | Failed the placebo check | Excluding names whose earnings release ran more than 10 calendar days past its point-in-time estimate read +1.69pp CAGR vs the Oct 13 rules (139.71% vs 138.02%), but the same flags shifted 21 and 63 sessions later - when the names were not late - read the same +1.57pp, the flagged names made up only 0.072% of the book's weight-days against a pre-registered 1% kill line, the 7-day neighbour lost -3.73pp, two of four anchors lost and the four-year median was -1.03pp: the gain is selection-path noise from a handful of forced exits, not a late-reporting effect. |
| VVIX spike / mean reversion as a TQQQ FAST re-entry trigger on the Oct 14 rules | +1.34pp CAGR vs the Oct 14-22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the current starting account | Concentration (a few names or years carry the result) | Re-entering TQQQ FAST once VVIX fell to 0.80x of a spike high in the last 20 rows (the literal spike form was inert - it fires at the volatility peak, where the existing entry guard blocks every row) added 16 FAST rows in 5 of 13 gate-off spells and +1.34pp CAGR vs the Oct 14 rules (142.84% vs 141.51%), positive at all four anchors, fixed-January walk-forward 133.47% vs 132.56% and breaches unchanged, but it failed the neighbourhood item: the VVIX >= 120 neighbour lost -0.64pp, the other two neighbours gained only +0.51pp each and all three lost in 2022 onward; the gain is one episode - seven sessions in June 2010 add +17.3pp to that year, and leaving 2010 out cuts the annualised gain to +0.12pp (DSR 0.007). |
| QQQ IBS mean reversion as a TQQQ sleeve boost on the Oct 14 rules | -0.03pp CAGR vs the Oct 14-22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the current starting account | Failed the placebo check | Raising the gated TQQQ sleeve from weight 0.5 to 0.6 while QQQ's internal bar strength state is long (in below 0.10, out above 0.90; 34% of rows, about 16 entries a year) returned 141.48% vs 141.51% (-0.03pp), with train -0.45, a 4-year-window median -2.45, one of four anchors positive, a 5/10 switch test and -0.03pp at 10 bps; the placebo that boosts the opposite state gained +1.14pp and beat it, because the margin-bound account turns the boost into a swap (TQQQ gross +0.048x, stock book -0.052x on boosted rows) and the deltas are path noise; stressed-margin forced liquidations rose from 433 to 726, and the literal QQQ 0.10 satellite lost -0.09pp. |
| Margin backlog: completing margin-clipped buys on later sessions, on the Oct 14 rules | +0.29pp CAGR vs the Oct 14-22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the current starting account | Failed the placebo check | Completing stock buys that initial margin had clipped, on later sessions whenever headroom above a 5% equity reserve appeared, returned 141.79% vs 141.51% (+0.29pp), but it bought on only 78 sessions in 16.6 years and filled 1.6% of the clipped notional (margin binds on 66% of trade rows, with a mean buy fraction of 0.23 when it does); a plain vol-target raise to the same average stock exposure earned +0.56pp and beat it (-0.28pp, 1 of 10 held-out halves), the switch test was 7/10 and the 4-year-window median fell 0.65pp; with no reserve the gain rose to +2.19pp, but its own matched vol-target raise earned +4.33pp. |
| Pre-release admission: the admission rule's rank gate relaxed inside the candidate's own release window, on the Oct 14 rules | -4.67pp CAGR vs the Oct 14-22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the current starting account | Failed the placebo check (also: Failed the walk-forward) | Letting the leader-admission rule take a bigger name from further down the ranking than the live rule allows, only while that name sat inside the pre-release boost's own window before its estimated earnings release, added 49 sleeve admissions on 17 dates and returned 136.83% vs 141.51% (-4.67pp), with train -5.05, 2022 onward -3.66, 11% of 4-year windows won, fixed-January walk-forward 127.00% vs 132.56%, a 1/10 switch test and all four anchors negative; the same rule on windows shifted a month earlier gained +0.93pp and beat it, the admitted names trailed the names they replaced by 2.0% over 20 sessions, and the same wider gate with no release condition lost 10.34pp. |
| Admission confirmation: two-consecutive-row confirmation of admissions on the Oct 14 rules | -1.56pp CAGR vs the Oct 14-22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the current starting account | Failed the placebo check | Requiring the leader-emergence admission condition to hold on two consecutive decision rows before an admission fires returned 140.11% vs the pinned Oct 14 rules' 141.67% (-1.56pp CAGR; fixed-Jan walk-forward 132.47% vs 132.69%): the confirmation arm's equity path is bit-identical to the placebo that delays every admission by one row unconditionally, so the confirmation effect is exactly zero and the net is the delay cost alone - 0 of the control's 82 admissions fired on time, 70 fired one row late and 12 were lost, the loss concentrates in 2020 (-48.35pp) and 2024 (-23.16pp), the walk-forward family picks the control in all 12 years, and the deflated Sharpe ratio of the delta is 0.000; none of the control's admissions had the condition hold on the preceding row, so on this crossing signal confirmation is structurally a delay, and a five-session-old condition lost -9.51pp. |
| Daily refresh of each stock sleeve's volatility scaling factor between its own rebalances, on the Oct 14 rules | +1.54pp CAGR vs the Oct 14-22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the current starting account | Concentration (a few names or years carry the result) (also: Negative in the fresh era (2022 onward)) | Recomputing each stock sleeve's volatility scaling factor every session between its own rebalances, and resizing the sleeve whenever the fresh factor moved 20% or more from the one it carried, added +1.54pp CAGR vs the Oct 14 rules (143.05% vs 141.51%) and was positive at all four anchors, but the gain is 2020 alone (raises as volatility fell after the crash; with 2020 left out the annualised delta is -0.10pp), fresh 2022+ fell 3.68pp, the four-year-window median fell 2.17pp, the switch test was 8/10 and 7/10, and a plain raise of the volatility target to the same average stock exposure earned +1.64pp; the cut-only form lost -1.71pp, worse than a uniform cut to the same exposure (-0.39pp), because realized volatility peaks after the drop and the 2021 cuts came two sessions after the trough; a copy reading 20-session-old volatility earned +2.69pp, and headline-model breaches rose from 2 to 5 (DSR 0.003). |
| Announcement-return momentum gate: eligibility from a stock's last four earnings-release reactions, on the Oct 14 rules | -27.24pp CAGR vs the Oct 14-22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward (also: Negative in the fresh era (2022 onward)) | Making a stock ineligible, and selling it if held, when the sum of its last four earnings-release reactions against SPY (the two-day move around each results filing) was zero or negative returned 114.26% vs the Oct 14 rules' 141.51% (-27.24pp CAGR): the rule flagged 14% of the book's holdings and its largest holding on 14.5% of days, and removing those leaders lost in training (-23.58pp), in fresh 2022+ (-40.99pp), in all 151 four-year windows, at all four schedule anchors and in every held-out half of the switch test (0/10); the fixed-January walk-forward fell to 101.76% from 132.56%, every neighbour lost (two or eight releases, thresholds of -5% and +5%), the entry side alone lost -28.90pp and the exit side alone -17.02pp, and a placebo summing days 10-12 after each release lost more (-45.27pp) while flagging 2.4 times as many holdings, so the release reactions do not pick worse leaders than an arbitrary three-day sum; four-year windows with a margin breach fell from 47 to 0 at a deeper drawdown (-62.91% vs -54.39%), and the deflated Sharpe ratio is 0.000. |
| Drift-band re-weighting of each stock sleeve back to the market-cap weighting between its own rebalances, on the Oct 14 rules | +1.72pp CAGR vs the Oct 14-22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the current starting account | Concentration (a few names or years carry the result) (also: Failed the walk-forward) | Re-weighting a stock sleeve back to the market-cap weighting at its current size whenever its drifted weights sat 0.10 or more away from that target (156 times in 16.6 years, with the same picks and the same exposure) added +1.72pp CAGR vs the Oct 14 rules (143.23% vs 141.51%), was positive at all four schedule anchors and in fresh 2022+ (+3.18pp), and beat a copy re-weighting on the same days to 20-session-old weights (+0.93pp) and the same number of re-weights on a fixed calendar (-0.09pp); but the four-year-window median fell 1.47pp, the family January walk-forward ended 0.04pp under the control (132.52% vs 132.56%), the switch test was 9/10 without the embargo and 6/10 with it, and the gain sits in 2021 and 2026 (without both years the annualised delta is -0.49pp); margin breaches were unchanged and the deflated Sharpe ratio is 0.013. |
| Post-release tight rank cut: selling a held stock that falls out of the top seven in the five sessions after its own earnings release, on the Oct 14 rules | +8.73pp CAGR vs the Oct 14-22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Selling a held stock at the next open when it ranked worse than 7th among the eligible names in any of the five sessions after its own earnings-release filing, without waiting for a clearly better replacement, added +8.73pp CAGR vs the Oct 14 rules (150.23% vs 141.51%) with a fixed-January walk-forward of 137.73% vs 132.56%; it was positive in training (+11.50pp), at all four schedule anchors (+4.77 to +8.71pp) and with 2020 or 2024 left out, and it beat the same rule on non-announcement days (-9.62pp) and a plain leverage increase to the same average exposure (+0.85pp); but fresh 2022+ was flat (+0.01pp), the response peaked at the 7th-rank cut (5th +3.70pp, 10th +1.57pp), and the family January walk-forward, which re-picks the window and the rank cut each year, chose the 5th-rank cut in three early years and ended 0.82pp under the control (131.74%); the drawdown was not reduced (-54.73% vs -54.39%), margin breaches were unchanged and the deflated Sharpe ratio is 0.014. |
| Revenue-acceleration rotation margin: a wider replacement gap for held stocks whose revenue growth is accelerating most and a narrower one for the weakest, on the Oct 14 rules | -5.77pp CAGR vs the Oct 14-22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward (also: Negative in the fresh era (2022 onward)) | Scaling the score gap a held stock that has slipped in rank must face before it is swapped out by its revenue-growth acceleration among the eligible names (one cross-sectional standard deviation wider for the top third, one narrower for the bottom third; 69 exits differ in 16.6 years) cost -5.77pp CAGR vs the Oct 14 rules (135.74% vs 141.51%); it lost in training (-6.84pp), in fresh 2022+ (-2.37pp), at all four schedule anchors (-2.07 to -5.78pp), at half and one-and-a-half times the step (-0.55 and -4.90pp) and with halves instead of thirds (-9.36pp), and the same rule on acceleration four quarters stale lost about as much (-6.05pp); its own fixed-January walk-forward was 134.46% vs 132.56% only because the loss sat in 2011 (an early sale of the book's largest holding, which then rose) and 2026 (a kept leader that then fell), while the family January walk-forward ended at 132.31%, the switch test was 5/10 both ways and the deflated Sharpe ratio is 0.000; the drawdown and margin breaches were unchanged. |
| Revenue-acceleration-confirmed drift band: re-weighting a stock sleeve back to the market-cap weighting between its own rebalances only toward a stock whose revenue growth is accelerating most, on the Oct 14 rules | +3.24pp CAGR vs the Oct 14-22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the current starting account | Concentration (a few names or years carry the result) | Re-weighting a stock sleeve back to the market-cap weighting at its current size between its own rebalances, only when one of its stocks sat 0.10 or more below its target weight while that stock's revenue-growth acceleration was in the top third of the eligible names (91 times in 16.6 years, at the same exposure), added +3.24pp CAGR vs the Oct 14 rules (144.75% vs 141.51%) with a fixed-January walk-forward of 135.08% vs 132.56%; it was positive in training (+1.56pp), in fresh 2022+ (+6.92pp), at all four schedule anchors (+1.66 to +2.74pp), at bands of 0.05 and 0.20 and with halves instead of thirds (+2.11 to +2.63pp), the family January walk-forward ended at 132.99%, and it beat the same rule on acceleration four quarters stale (+2.20pp), on a random third of the names (+2.07pp), the same number of re-weights on a fixed calendar (+3.39pp) and the up-drift rule without the acceleration condition (+1.59pp); but three months carried 90.5% of its active return and 70% fell in the first 63 sessions of a calendar year, so the switch test with the embargo that removes those sessions was 7/10 (10/10 without it), and in training the condition did no better than the stale or random ones (-0.19 and -0.26pp); the drawdown and margin breaches were unchanged and the deflated Sharpe ratio is 0.174. |
| TQQQ trend check on top of the volatility gate: the TQQQ sleeve held at zero while QQQ closes more than 2% below its 50-day average, back on above it, on the Oct 14 rules (a drawdown guard) | -13.45pp CAGR vs the Oct 14 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | Holding the TQQQ sleeve at zero while QQQ closed more than 2% below its 50-day average (back on above it), on top of the existing volatility gate, was judged as a drawdown guard and failed: maximum drawdown moved only from -54.39% to -53.62% on the research model and from -57.62% to -57.66% on the headline model (the bar asked for 2.0pp shallower on both), because the worst drawdown was a single-stock fall in early 2021 that the trend check whipsawed through (it avoided 15% of that episode's TQQQ loss); it cost -13.45pp CAGR vs the Oct 14 rules (128.06% vs 141.51%) and the fixed-January walk-forward fell to 120.66% vs 132.56%. It did cut the 2025 drawdown from -53.20% to -39.31%, removed every margin breach, was shallower at all four schedule anchors and beat a 20-session-late placebo, but a plain smaller TQQQ sleeve with the same average TQQQ exposure did better on the headline model (-54.62%) and on the walk-forward (132.67%). |
| Single-company cap without cutting exposure: the largest company's value across the stock sleeves capped at one times equity on every trade, the excess moved to the same sleeves' other picks by market cap, on the Oct 14 rules (a drawdown guard) | -30.79pp CAGR vs the Oct 14 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward (also: Failed the placebo check) | Capping the largest company's value, summed over the stock sleeves, at one times equity on every rebalance, entry and resize (it bound on 80% of them), with the excess moved to the same sleeves' other picks by market cap, was judged as a drawdown guard and failed: the largest company's peak fell from 1.94 to 1.19 times equity, but maximum drawdown moved only from -54.39% to -53.73% on the research model and from -57.62% to -57.98% on the headline model (the bar asked for 2.0pp shallower on both), because the second names fell with the leader (the 2025, 2020 and 2018 drawdowns got deeper while 2021 and 2026 got shallower) and margin limits blocked part of the re-weighting's purchases; it cost -30.79pp CAGR vs the Oct 14 rules (110.71% vs 141.51%) and the fixed-January walk-forward fell to 101.85% vs 132.56%. It cut forced liquidations under the stress preset from 433 to 110 and was shallower at all four schedule anchors, but a plain lower volatility target with the same average stock exposure did better on both drawdowns (-53.41% and -55.48%) and on the walk-forward (126.31%), and the same cap applied on randomly shifted days was shallower than the rule itself. |
| Low-correlation co-leader: a quarter of every stock sleeve dominated by the largest company held in the best-ranked eligible stock whose recent daily returns are nearly uncorrelated with it, on the Oct 14 rules (a drawdown guard) | -35.00pp CAGR vs the Oct 14 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward (also: Negative in the fresh era (2022 onward)) | Holding a quarter of every stock sleeve that the book's largest company dominates in the best-ranked eligible stock whose daily returns over the prior six months had a correlation of 0.30 or less with that company (swapped at equal value, so the exposure stayed the same) was judged as a drawdown guard and failed: maximum drawdown deepened from -54.39% to -55.11% on the research model and from -57.62% to -59.04% on the headline model (the bar asked for 2.0pp shallower on both). The low correlation held in calm markets but not in the sell-offs: the co-leader helped when the leader fell alone (the early-2021 and 2025-26 drawdowns got shallower), but in 2020 it was a stock that fell 61% while the leader fell 24%, and the 2025, 2020, 2011 and 2018 drawdowns got deeper. It cost -35.00pp CAGR vs the Oct 14 rules (106.50% vs 141.51%), -45.08pp in fresh 2022 onward, and the fixed-January walk-forward fell to 96.80% vs 132.56%. It cut forced liquidations under the stress preset from 433 to 135 and was shallower than the same rule with a random, a most-correlated or a market-cap-chosen second stock, but a plain lower volatility target with the same average stock exposure did better on both drawdowns (-53.35% and -56.15%) and on the walk-forward (130.28%). |
| Low implied correlation as a TQQQ warning: the TQQQ sleeve halved while Cboe's three-month implied correlation index sits in the bottom fifth of its prior two years, on the Oct 14 rules with the smaller leveraged-ETF sleeve (a drawdown guard) | +1.34pp CAGR vs the Oct 14 rules with the smaller leveraged-ETF sleeve; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02; the current starting account | Failed the placebo check | Halving the TQQQ sleeve's target, while the volatility gate had it on, whenever Cboe's three-month implied correlation index closed at or below the 20th percentile of its prior two years (38% of the days the sleeve was on; combined with the existing TQQQ cut by the smaller multiplier, not the product) was judged as a drawdown guard and failed the placebo check. Maximum drawdown improved from -54.39% to -51.84% on the research model and from -57.62% to -55.20% on the headline model, it added +1.34pp CAGR vs the Oct 14 rules with the smaller leveraged-ETF sleeve (150.15% vs 148.82%), the fixed-January walk-forward rose to 143.86% vs 141.23%, the drawdown was shallower at all four schedule anchors, and it beat a plain smaller TQQQ sleeve with the same average TQQQ exposure (-54.70% and -55.61%, walk-forward 140.53%). But the same cut on the same pattern of days moved six months later was shallower still on both models (-50.64% and -54.65%), so the drawdown gain came from a cut clustered in time, not from what low correlation predicts. The state was often on at the peaks but switched off inside most drawdowns and missed the 2025-26 one, and in early 2021 the stock book used the freed margin and lost more in its largest stock. Margin breaches fell from 1 / 2 / 47 to 0 / 1 / 0 (research path / headline path / four-year windows) and forced liquidations under the stress preset from 428 to 405. |
| Top-name break re-weight: capping the book's largest company at half of each stock sleeve while it trades 10% or more below its 63-session high, the rest moved to the sleeve's other picks, on the Oct 14-22 rules (a drawdown guard) | -21.97pp CAGR vs the Oct 14-22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-14; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward (also: Failed the placebo check) | Capping the book's largest company at half of each stock sleeve's weight whenever it closed 10% or more below its 63-session high (19.7% of days), with the excess moved to the sleeve's other picks at the same total exposure, was judged as a drawdown guard and made drawdowns deeper, not shallower: maximum drawdown -59.96% vs -57.92% on the research model and -60.02% vs -58.89% on the headline model, CAGR 139.51% vs 161.48%, fixed-January walk-forward 129.15% vs 157.38%, and it lost in every one of the 151 rolling four-year windows. |
| Pre-release boost held one more session (starting one session earlier): the boost and the TQQQ cut kept on through the session after the top holding's estimated earnings release, on the Oct 15 rules | +1.25pp CAGR vs the Oct 15 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-14; the current starting account | Mechanism overlap | Holding the pre-release boost (and the smaller leveraged-ETF sleeve) one session longer, through the session after the top holding's estimated earnings release (lo 0 instead of 1), was given a full pre-registered validation on the Oct 15 rules control and rejected on its neighbours: it added +1.25pp CAGR (162.41% vs 161.16%) and +1.31pp to the fixed-January walk-forward and passed the four-year windows, anchors, switch, leave-out, cost and placebo items, but a smaller boost (x1.20) at the same setting lost 0.29pp while a larger one (x1.30) gained 2.40pp, and one extra boosted session placed away from the release earned most of the gain (+0.93pp), so the gain is extra exposure on boosted days, not timing around the release. Drawdowns and margin breaches were unchanged. |
| Leader-dip boost, only in an uptrend: the stock book raised by a quarter while the largest holding trades 5.6% or more below its 52-week high and the Nasdaq-100 is above its 200-day average, on the Oct 14-22 rules | +4.35pp CAGR vs the Oct 15 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-14; the current starting account | Negative in the fresh era (2022 onward) (also: Failed the exposure-matched check) | A retry of the leader-dip boost that only bought the dip while the Nasdaq-100 was above its 200-day average, a filter chosen on 2010-2021 to skip crash onsets. It added 4.4pp of CAGR (165.5% vs 161.2%) and 4.3pp to the fixed-January walk-forward, but from 2022 on it trailed the strategy without it (-2.0pp) and a plain boost with the same average exposure (-5.7pp): the filter removed exactly the dips that paid after 2021. It did not make the worst drawdown any shallower, because that drawdown (early 2021) was a single-stock break inside a bull market. It failed the pre-registered out-of-sample and exposure-matched checks. |
| Leader-dip boost: the stock book raised by a quarter while the largest holding trades 5.6% or more below its 52-week high, on the Oct 14-22 rules | +10.64pp CAGR vs the Oct 15 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-14; the current starting account | Failed the exposure-matched check | Raising the stock book by a quarter whenever its largest holding had pulled back 5.6% or more from its 52-week high (37% of days; the margin limit let only about a quarter of the boost through) added 10.6pp of CAGR (171.8% vs 161.2%) and 11.9pp to the fixed-January walk-forward, held out of sample from 2022 (+19.9pp), and beat ten time-shifted copies of itself. But against a plain boost with the same average exposure it made drawdowns slightly deeper (-60.0% vs -59.8% on the research model, -60.6% vs -60.0% on the headline model) and added margin breaches in the early 2021 and 2026 sell-offs, because buying the leader's dip also buys the start of real crashes. It failed the pre-registered exposure-matched check. |
| Dip-step: two rungs of stock-book dose on the lead's 252-session high, at the live dip's average gross | -0.64pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward (also: Deepened the worst drawdown) | Replacing the single 5.6% dip boost with two rungs (weights 1 and 2 at 5.62% and 11.24% below the lead's 252-session high), scaled so the average stock gross matched Oct 22 rules, cut the fixed-January walk-forward from 171.61% to 170.96% and deepened the worst drawdown from -55.28% to -57.32%. Headline breaches rose from 17 to 19. Turnover fell slightly. The deep rung was real (17% of rows, 64% of the boost) and was not killed at step 0. |
| Daily appreciation resize: re-size held stocks after account gains when margin headroom permits, on the Oct 14-22 rules | +1.47pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the exposure-matched check (also: Failed the walk-forward) | Re-sizing the held stock book after account gains added 1.47pp to the fixed-January walk-forward, short of the 2pp bar, and increased stress breaches from 311 to 475. It finished 0.07pp behind a constant exposure increase with the same average stock gross, so the gain came from extra exposure rather than the appreciation timing. Re-sizing every day was worse than the control by 2.73pp and produced 779 stress breaches. |
| Ten interactions among the dip boost, pre-release boost, post-release cut and leveraged-ETF routing, on the Oct 14-22 rules | +1.46pp fixed-January walk-forward vs Oct 22 rules; window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Failed the walk-forward | None of ten pre-stated interactions among the current stock and leveraged-ETF rules passed the card. The best arm turned the dip boost off while the post-release cut was active: it added 1.46pp to the fixed-January walk-forward with unchanged worst drawdown, headline breaches and stress, but missed the 2pp bar. The only arm with a materially shallower drawdown gave up 10.81pp of walk-forward. |
| Dip-state leveraged-ETF routing: raise the stock book and cut the leveraged Nasdaq sleeve while the lead stock is below its high, on the Oct 14-22 rules | +11.71pp fixed-January walk-forward vs the Oct 14-22 rules (Oct 14 rules); window 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-16; the current starting account | Deepened the worst drawdown | Routing exposure from the leveraged Nasdaq sleeve into the stock book while the lead stock was below its high added 11.71pp to the fixed-January walk-forward and beat a constant exposure increase by 6.65pp. It nevertheless deepened the worst drawdown by 4.32pp on the research model and 3.43pp on the headline model, raised headline breaches from 6 to 16, and raised stress breaches from 364 to 566, so it failed the risk conditions. |
Stopped by a diagnostic (14)
| Candidate | Headline delta | Reason | Deciding facts |
|---|---|---|---|
| Directionless stand-down for the TQQQ sleeve: the sleeve to cash while QQQ's efficiency ratio over 63 or 126 sessions is below a threshold, on the Oct 14-22 rules (a drawdown guard) | No delta (stopped by a diagnostic before a backtest) | Stopped by a diagnostic | Stopped at the pre-registered selection step, with no test cells run. Standing the TQQQ sleeve down whenever QQQ's daily efficiency ratio (net move divided by path length) over 63 or 126 sessions fell below 0.10, 0.15 or 0.20 did cut the sleeve's losses on flat versions of 2010-2021 (by 1.6 to 8.5 points a year), but at every one of the six settings it cost 13.9 to 26.1 points of 2010-2021 CAGR against a 2-point limit. Daily QQQ moves are noisy even in a strong bull market (the ratio's median was 0.11 to 0.13), so the rule kept the sleeve out of the market for 50% to 93% of the trend. |
| Short program (short the weakest names) | No delta (stopped by a diagnostic before a backtest) | Stopped by a diagnostic | The pre-registered forward-return check (834 twenty-session windows) found the short candidates lag the eligible-pool average but still beat SPY by +2.3pp/yr and +2.6pp/yr under the earlier and the current market-cap weighting, with break-even borrow at -2.3% against the required +5% assumption and a 49% hit rate, so the check failed, no short book was ever simulated, and the decision on 2026-10-13 was 'long only for now'. |
| Short book on Oct 11 rules - engine feasibility | No delta (stopped by a diagnostic before a backtest) | Stopped by a diagnostic | The pre-registered feasibility check failed before any run: the step2 engine cannot express short stock positions (selection takes rank-top only and every weighting scheme returns non-negative weights), its margin model prices a short on signed (netted) market value, and it carries no borrow rate, fee, recall or dividend-paid model. |
| Winter-rotation sleeve (GLD/TLT/BIL momentum on idle cash) | No delta (stopped by a diagnostic before a backtest) | Stopped by a diagnostic | The sleeve was inert, not negative (measured delta +0.00pp CAGR and +0.00pp walk-forward OOS): mean idle cash is 0.12% of equity (median 0%), so there was no idle capital to rotate and the premise was refuted by measurement before the construct could bind. |
| Put/call fear extreme as a TQQQ FAST re-entry trigger on the Oct 13 rules | No delta (stopped by a diagnostic before a backtest) | Stopped by a diagnostic | Dropped at mechanics, with no strategy run and no trials: a 10-day mean equity put/call ratio above 0.80 falls on 38 gate-off rows in four fear spells (2011-08, 2018-12, 2020-03, 2022-11/12), but every trigger row sits at 0.846-1.000x its spell's running volatility peak, so adding it to the existing re-entry trigger adds exactly one FAST row in 16 years (2022-12-02); only the hold form acts - 38 FAST rows at the volatility peak, before the low - which is the form already rejected for the insider-spike trigger. |
| Coppock-curve regime for the TQQQ sleeve, on the Oct 14 rules | No delta (stopped by a diagnostic before a backtest) | Stopped by a diagnostic | Dropped at the mechanics check, with no strategy run: the monthly SPY Coppock curve (a 10-month weighted average of the 14- and 11-month rates of change) turned up from below zero only in 2009-05, 2016-05 and 2023-03 (in 2020 it never went below zero), so letting TQQQ through the volatility gate for 12 months after each signal changes 8 sessions in 16 years, all in the May 2010 flash crash at its volatility peak; the gate is already on in 98.6% of those sessions, which makes the QQQ version the already-rejected post-bear re-risk satellite. |
| Overnight equity-premium park for the leveraged-ETF sleeve's idle dollars on the Oct 14 rules | No delta (stopped by a diagnostic before a backtest) | Stopped by a diagnostic | Dropped at mechanics, with no strategy run and no trials: holding QQQ worth half of equity only overnight (bought at the close, sold at the next open) while the leveraged-ETF sleeve's volatility gate is off would have needed a positive close-to-open return net of 10 bps a night on the 2010-2021 gate-off nights, but on those 184 nights (6.1% of sessions) QQQ's overnight return was -0.033% gross and -0.133% net, while its intraday leg was +0.089%; over all nights the overnight premium was real (+0.056%, t 4.0) but sat in the calm regime and was about half the round-trip cost. |
| Book-level industry weight cap on new fills on the Oct 14 rules | No delta (stopped by a diagnostic before a backtest) | Stopped by a diagnostic | Dropped at mechanics, with no trials: a cap skipping any new stock whose industry already held 70% of the stock book would bind on 94.1% of sessions, and on 99.3% of those one name alone held 70% (the largest name's median share of the stock book is 99.4%), so the sleeves' overlap is single-name concentration rather than industry concentration; the 2021 margin breach and the five worst drawdown troughs each sat 98.9-100% in one name, which a cap acting only on new fills cannot reduce. |
| Stale-leader replacement (the exit mirror of leader admission) on the Oct 14 rules | No delta (stopped by a diagnostic before a backtest) | Stopped by a diagnostic | Dropped at mechanics, with no trials: swapping a sleeve's largest name for a top-2 leader at least half its size once the largest name had decayed to rank 9 or worse fires on only 6 dates in 16.6 years (20 sleeve swaps), and its trigger covers 0.50% of the stock book's weight-days, because the rank buffer, the daily check and the leader admission already clear decayed dominant names; on the six swaps the incoming name trailed the outgoing one by 15.5% over the next 20 sessions. |
| Earnings-record-conditioned hold of the pre-release boost through the top holding's release session, on the Oct 14 rules | No delta (stopped by a diagnostic before a backtest) | Stopped by a diagnostic | Dropped at mechanics, with no trials: keeping the pre-release boost on through the largest holding's estimated earnings-release session only when that stock's last four release reactions against SPY summed to more than zero would almost never have differed from holding through every time, because the record was positive on 91.5% of the 47 sessions where the rule could act (the pre-registered limit was 90%), so it could have skipped only 4 of them, and the holding rose over the release session on all 4 (+2.25% on average, about the same as the other 43); the unconditional hold was tested separately. |
| Release-keyed re-weight: re-weighting a stock sleeve back to the market-cap weighting on the session after a holding's own earnings release, on the Oct 14 rules | No delta (stopped by a diagnostic before a backtest) | Stopped by a diagnostic | Dropped at mechanics, with no trials: re-weighting a stock sleeve back to the market-cap weighting on the session after one of its stocks' own earnings-release filing, when that stock's target weight sat 0.05 or more above its drifted weight, would have fired only 22 times in 16.6 years (0.15% of sleeve-days, none after 2019), under the pre-registered minimum of 40 re-weights and 1% of sleeve-days. |
| Leader change inside a sleeve: re-weighting a stock sleeve back to the market-cap weighting when a different holding becomes its largest company, on the Oct 14 rules | No delta (stopped by a diagnostic before a backtest) | Stopped by a diagnostic | Dropped at mechanics, with no trials: re-weighting a stock sleeve back to the market-cap weighting when its largest company by market cap was not its largest holding and led it by 5% or more would have fired in only 23 episodes in 16.6 years (11 of them in 2021), under the pre-registered minimum of 30. |
| Margin-cushion re-target: every sleeve and the leveraged-ETF sleeve resized back to their own targets when the account's equity falls to 1.25x its maintenance requirement, on the Oct 14 rules with the smaller leveraged-ETF sleeve (a drawdown guard) | No delta (stopped by a diagnostic before a backtest) | Stopped by a diagnostic | Dropped at mechanics, with no trials: the guard was to resize every stock sleeve and the leveraged-ETF sleeve back to their own targets at the next open (same picks and weights) whenever the account closed with equity at or below 1.25 times its maintenance requirement, with a five-session cooldown, and the pre-registered check needed it to fire at least 5 times. On the research margin model it fired on only 3 closes in 16.6 years (March 2021, March 2025 and March 2026), each with 16-28% of that drawdown still ahead; each time it trimmed the drift above target (stock exposure down 0.11-0.17x equity, the leveraged-ETF sleeve back to 0.50x, no buys), but the 2020, 2011 and 2018 drawdowns never got that thin. On the headline model, whose requirement adds a concentration stress term, the same threshold is routine (7.4% of closes, 70 firings), so it becomes a frequent re-target that often buys rather than a crash guard. |
| Industry run-up crash guard: the stock book scaled to three quarters while the dominant holding's industry has doubled against the market over two years with at least two bubble warning signs, on the Oct 14-22 rules (a drawdown guard) | No delta (stopped by a diagnostic before a backtest) | Stopped by a diagnostic | Scaling the stock book to three quarters while the largest holding's industry had more than doubled against the market over two years and showed at least two of four bubble warning signs (accelerating gains, rising volatility, share issuance, many young firms) was stopped at its pre-registered mechanics check: the signal was on at the peak of only two of the six largest drawdowns (early 2021 in carmakers, late 2024) and silent in the other four (2011, the 2020 crash, both 2026 drawdowns), so it could not be a general drawdown guard. No trials were charged. |
4. Risks
- Drawdowns: -57% in the backtest of the current rules (2021-01-26 to 2021-03-08, headline model; -60% with Robinhood-style margin). Expect deeper ones.
- Leverage: up to 2x at rebalances, more after drift. A gap down past the margin buffer forces sales at the open.
- Concentration: one stock can exceed 100% of equity (under the current rules MU reached 268% of equity on 2026-03-30). Each sleeve holds almost only its largest pick, and the daily check refills every sleeve from the same ranking: under the current rules the four sleeves hold the same names on 71% of sessions and the same largest pick on 93%. A single-name crash hits hard.
- TQQQ: daily reset. A choppy decline while the gate is on can lose most of the sleeve. The faster re-entry buys back while volatility is still elevated; a second leg down after it would hit the sleeve.
- Regime: the backtest covers one rate and market-structure regime (2010+). It may not repeat.
- Overfitting: the rules were selected on the same data. Live returns are likely lower.
- Daily check: the between-rebalance sales are decided on the prior close and filled at the open, so a stale feed or a missed daily run degrades the rule (section 3).
- Pre-release boost: it holds a larger stock book into the largest holding's earnings release window; a release that comes earlier than estimated, or a sharp move before it, hits the larger book. It needs a daily feed of earnings-release filings; if that feed is missing or stale the day is not traded.
- Quality strip: the hard strip can empty a sleeve slot when a held name fails the screen; the soft strip does not force held names out, so a soft-flagged holding can stay until another rule exits it.
- Delisting: a non-acquisition delisting is a total loss of that position.
5. Trade log
Daily trade log: every backtest trading day (date, ticker, buy or sell, weight before and after as % of equity, reason) and the live log, updated after each daily run. Weights only; no prices, share counts or account amounts.
6. Changelog
- 2026-10-31: the charts, the two-margin-model table, the calendar-year returns and the 2022-onward figures are redrawn for the current rules, from the same engine run as the headline figures; a drawdown chart is added. The tables for retired rule sets are removed from this section.
- 2026-10-31: the results table's current-rules row is now measured in every column, with the same code and the same 151 four-year windows as the earlier rows: four-year CAGR median 167.0%, 10th percentile 110.3%, worst +86.8%; Sharpe 1.84.
- 2026-10-31: strategy change. The paper strategy changes. The inventory-versus-revenue screen is removed from the soft quality strip; the hard strip, the gross-margin screen and every other rule are unchanged. The screen's measured gain was not trusted: it compared each company with its sector's median, and where that median was negative the comparison ran backwards, and most of its gain came from one stock flagged in March 2020 through that reversal. Fixed-January walk-forward 231.31% on the research basis vs 247.87% for the prior control on the same data (data through 2026-10-28); CAGR 214.0% vs 225.2%; maximum drawdown -59.8% on the research basis and -57.2% on the headline model, both unchanged to the first decimal. Over 20 start-day shifts of the schedule the walk-forward is 15.8 points lower on average. Paper results recorded before 2026-10-31 were made with the screen on.
- 2026-10-29: paper strategy change. The post-release cut is removed: since 2026-10-16 the stock book had been held at a smaller size for a set number of sessions after the largest holding's own earnings release whenever the stock reacted worse than the Nasdaq-100 over the release. Nothing else changes. Fixed-January walk-forward 247.87% on the research basis vs 243.61% for the prior control on the same data (data through 2026-10-28); CAGR 225.2% vs 222.3%. The maximum drawdown is deeper: -59.8% vs -55.4% on the research basis and -57.2% vs -55.4% on the headline model. Over 20 start-day shifts of the schedule the mean CAGR is 218.2% vs 216.1% and the mean maximum drawdown -61.9% vs -55.5%. Exact cut values are not published.
- 2026-10-29: paper strategy change: slower re-rank schedule. Each stock sleeve now re-ranks less often than before; on the re-weight days in between it keeps its picks and only resets weights, volatility scaling and the quality strip. All sleeves re-weight on the same days. Fixed-January walk-forward 243.61% on the research basis vs 221.73% for the prior control on the same data (data through 2026-10-28); maximum drawdown -55.4% vs -55.3%. Over 60 start-day shifts of the schedule it beat the prior control at every one; at 3 of them the maximum drawdown was deeper than the accepted limit (up to 0.74 points deeper than the prior control at the same shift). Exact schedule values are not published.
- 2026-10-28: paper strategy change: two more soft screens. It replaces the soft screen of the first quality strip (it is not added on top): the soft screen now also flags inventory growing faster than revenue relative to the sector, and a year-over-year fall in gross margin. The hard strip is unchanged. Fixed-January walk-forward 223.13% on the research basis (prior control 211.01%). Sector labels are current, not point-in-time. Exact thresholds are not published.
- 2026-10-28: paper strategy change: quality strip added. After the stock sleeves form, a hard balance-sheet strip removes failing names; a held-immune soft balance-sheet and accrual strip can cut weight on other failing names without forcing a held name out. Fixed-January walk-forward 211.01% on the research basis (prior control 171.61%). Exact strip thresholds are not published.
- 2026-10-24: the current-rules table gains five comparator rows (QQQ with a 200-day trend rule, VGT, Bitcoin from September 2014, NVIDIA and Broadcom) and two time-underwater columns (share of sessions below the running peak, and the longest spell in months; median / worst per four-year window).
- 2026-10-24: the results table shows the current rules next to buy-and-hold TQQQ, QQQ and SPY. Research-basis CAGR 173.0% through 2026-10-16, MaxDD -55.3%, Sharpe 1.71 through 2026-10-02. The charts are still the previously published path.
- 2026-10-14: pre-release boost adopted. When the stock the strategy holds most of is in the run-up to its estimated next earnings release, the stock book is held at a larger size, from the next open until the open of the estimated release day. Backtest CAGR 143.7% -> 150.2%, MaxDD -57.6% -> -57.6%, margin breaches 2 -> 2 (the same dates), fresh four-year starts with a breach 60 -> 60 of 151 (Robinhood-style margin 136.8% -> 140.2%, breaches 1 -> 1, 47 -> 47 of 151). Research simulator: 138.0% -> 141.5%, walk-forward 128.7% -> 132.6%. Its limits are listed in section 3.
- 2026-10-14: the backtest now starts from a smaller notional account, so the higher borrowing spreads of a small loan apply for longer. The rules are unchanged; only the backtest's financing moves. Backtest CAGR 144.1% -> 143.7% (Robinhood-style margin 137.1% -> 136.8%); MaxDD, the margin breaches and the fresh four-year starts with a breach are unchanged. Research simulator: 138.3% -> 138.0%, walk-forward 128.9% -> 128.7%.
- 2026-10-13: admission adopted. On every session each sleeve also admits the best-ranked name it does not hold when that name sits at the top of the ranking and is larger by market cap than every name the sleeve holds; it replaces the worst-ranked held name and the sleeve re-weights. Backtest CAGR 129.5% -> 144.1%, MaxDD -66.7% -> -57.6%, margin breaches 2 -> 2 (2018-07-30 replaced by 2020-02-28), fresh four-year starts with a breach 79 -> 60 of 151 (Robinhood-style margin 123.0% -> 137.1%, breaches 1 -> 1, 47 -> 47 of 151). Research simulator: 124.1% -> 138.3%, walk-forward 114.9% -> 128.9%. Its limits are listed in section 3.
- 2026-10-13: the strategy is renamed Alphy (it had an internal code name). Name only: the rules and every number in this paper are unchanged.
- 2026-10-13: daily check adopted. Every stock sleeve is now checked on every session, not only at its scheduled rebalance: a held name that no longer passes the filters is sold at the next open, and a held name that has fallen in the ranking is sold when the best eligible name not held scores ahead of it by a wide statistical margin; the sleeve then refills and re-weights. The rank buffer returns to its earlier value, and eligibility again requires the long-term average to be rising (that rule drives the daily exits here; removing it from this configuration lowers the backtest by 1.3 points, while the same removal from the previous rules changed nothing). Backtest CAGR 110.9% -> 129.5%, MaxDD -59.8% -> -66.7%, margin breaches 1 -> 2 (2018-07-30 added), fresh four-year starts with a breach 47 -> 79 of 151 (Robinhood-style margin 106.1% -> 123.0%, breaches 0 -> 1, 1 -> 47 of 151). Research simulator: 107.2% -> 124.1%, walk-forward 93.1% -> 114.9%. Its known weaknesses are listed in section 3.
- 2026-10-13: eligibility slope conjunct removed: a name no longer needs its long-term average to be rising. The rule bound on 26,985 of 293,868 otherwise-eligible cells (9.2%) over 2010-02-11 to 2026-10-02 and changed no pick, so the backtest results are unchanged; the inertness is empirical, not logical, and the check must be re-run if the rank buffer changes (at a tighter buffer the rule would change 3 rebalances).
- 2026-10-13: weighting power and the stock volatility target raised, and a faster TQQQ re-entry adopted. Backtest CAGR 97.8% -> 110.9% (Robinhood-style margin 93.8% -> 106.1%).
- 2026-10-11: weighting power raised. Backtest CAGR 93.1% -> 97.8% (Robinhood-style margin 88.9% -> 93.8%).
- 2026-10-11: stock volatility target raised.
- 2026-10-10: rank buffer tightened (a held name stays only while it ranks near the top of the ranking).
- 2026-10-10: delisting rule cause-aware (acquisitions cashed at the last close, other delistings a total loss).
- 2026-10-10: cash and distress filters compare each stock only with filings available at the time.